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ABSTRACT
The problem of primary interest in this dissertation is 
the general lack of understanding among marketing scholars 
concerning the role of epistemology in developing marketing 
theory. Because of this problem a primary hypothesis was 
formulated that a better approach to developing marketing 
theory can be produced through the study of epistemology.
A combination of primary and secondary research was used 
to establish the truth or falsity of the primary hypothesis. 
Each type of source was used to achieve different and sepa­
rate goals. Library or secondary research was used to 
investigate the potential importance of epistemology in de­
veloping marketing theory. Primary research in the form of 
a questionnaire survey was used to establish the degree of 
epistemological understanding among marketing scholars. The 
results from both investigations were combined in order to 
satisfy the requirements of the primary hypothesis.
The value of epistemology in developing marketing theory 
and, therefore, science in marketing was determined to be a 
function of the efficiency and desirability of performing 
that task. With respect to efficiency, an understanding of
xii
the problems of epistemology was determined to be a neces­
sary, but not sufficient, condition for marketing to become 
highly scientific. The one common bond between all fields 
of science lies in its method, not in its content. However, 
the existence of these facts does prevent some sound theory 
from being formulated without knowledge of epistemological 
problems. The efficiency of epistemological understanding 
was determined to be lessened, but not eliminated, by several 
problems. These problems include the unpredictability of 
human behavior, the inability to conduct controlled experi­
ments , the fact that the knowledge of a :theory must be con­
sidered as a variable, that value-oriented bias may be 
impossible to eliminate in the development of marketing 
theories, and that human behavior is partially determined by 
the mores of many different cultures.
Another aspect of the value which an item possesses is 
its desirability. No matter how efficient a device may be, 
if the results of its use are not desired, it is of no value. 
Determining the desirability of developing science in market­
ing requires a value judgement by both the people involved 
in marketing and the consumers. Benefits as well as certain 
undesirable occurrences accrue to both from the development
of science in marketing. Since the field of marketing has
xiii
already set out on the path toward the development of a 
science, this study contains the assumption that such a 
route is deemed desirable by the concerned parties. This 
judgement may easily change as marketing progresses in its 
guest.
Since an understanding of epistemology has been deter­
mined to be valuable in developing science in marketing, 
the results of the empirical part of this study were used to 
establish the degree of understanding that exists among those 
persons most likely to be formulating marketing theory. The 
results of this investigation indicated that the existing 
level of understanding is less than what is desirable. The 
results also indicated that marketing scholars generally 
believe that the existing body of marketing thought is not 
very theoretical (mean percent theoretical = 36.1%). These 
conclusions suggest that scholarly discussions (in texts, 
periodicals, etc.) about a suitable epistemology for market­
ing theorists may be a major factor for developing the field 
into a science.
xiv
CHAPTER X
EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN MARKETING
Introduction to the Problem
A great deal of interest has been generated of late in 
the area of theory in Marketing. The American Marketing 
Association holds its annual theory seminars. Two of the 
foremost journals on marketing thought. The Journal of 
Marketing and The Journal of Marketing Research, have had a 
substantial number of "theory" articles over the last several 
years. Also, the increasing importance of marketing science 
has added impetus to the drive for developing marketing 
theory.
The movement to develop theory in marketing has been 
less than well organized. Several approaches to marketing 
theory were reviewed by S c h w a r t z . H i s  conclusions were 
that none of these approaches yielded empirically valid 
marketing theory. What is especially interesting in
^George Schwartz, Development of Marketing Theory, 
South-Western Publishing Co., Cincinnati, Ohio, 1963, 152 pp.
^The approaches considered by Schwartz included those 
of Reilly and Converse (pp. 9-34) , Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (pp. 55-67), Grether (pp. 68-86) , McGarry
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studying these attempts at developing theory is the lack of 
a succinct approach.
When the attempts at formulating theory in marketing 
are compared with attempts at theory formulation in the 
physical sciences or well developed social sciences, one 
finds that those areas with well established theory have a 
concise, generally accepted view of how to formulate it. 
Typically, no single viewpoint has been accepted even in 
these areas. The minority opposition in the well establish­
ed areas state their objection(s) and offer the rules that 
they intend to follow in developing theory. Their alterna­
tives are generally clear and well formulated.^
The purpose of this dissertation is to show the impor­
tance of developing a common starting point from which to 
build marketing theory. It is now appropriate to define 
epistemology. Epistemology is the starting point. It is 
the theory or science of the method and grounds of knowledge.
(pp. 87-100), Alderson (pp. 101-114), Cox and Goodman (pp. 
115-121), and Breyer (pp. 121-125).
The area of economic theory provides a good, current 
example. The mainstream of thought in economic theory is 
occupied by a group labeled as positive economists. This 
group includes Samuelson, Friedman, and the large majority 
of living economists. A small minority of economists take 
another viewpoint on theory development. This group has been 
labeled as Extreme A Priorists, and it includes Von Mises, 
Knight, Robbins, and others. Their exceptions and view­
points are well developed in the literature.
A central theme of dissertation is that if a common episte­
mology is largely accepted by marketing scholars, a better 
approach to theory in marketing can be developed.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESIS
The problem of primary interest in this dissertation 
is the general lack of understanding among marketing scholars 
concerning the role of epistemology in developing marketing 
theory. The hypothesis upon which this study has been based 
is: It can be shown that a better approach to developing
marketing theory can be produced through study of the method 
and grounds of knowledge (epistemology). Incorporated in 
this hypothesis are the following three sub-hypotheses.
1. It can be shown that one criterion for judging 
a better approach to develop marketing theories 
is the degree to which marketing theorists under­
stand the problems of epistemology.
2. It can be illustrated that, if marketing is to 
become highly scientific, marketing scholars 
must develop the requirements for an accepted 
epistemology.
3. It can also be shown that unsettled differences 
among authorities on epistemology adversely 
affects the ability of marketing theorists to
4develop the field into a science.
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
This study was purposely limited to epistemological 
problems in marketing. Because of its keynote importance 
and the involved character of the topic, epistemology has 
been isolated from other important areas for the purpose 
of this study. If epistemology is the starting point in 
developing good marketing theory, then logic is the path 
to that goal. A discussion of logic has. been omitted ex­
cept as it has a supportive role in developing an investi­
gation on epistemology. Logic and epistemology are the two 
parts of methodology. The purpose of the omission of logic 
from the discussion in this paper is to center attention on 
the complex problems of epistemology. The .area of problems in 
logic as it applies to developing marketing theory is suit­
able for further study.
The population used in the mail survey section of this 
study consisted of academic members of the American Marketing 
Association. This population was assumed to be important in 
the future development of marketing theory. Persons, other 
than college and university professors who are members of the 
American Marketing Association, have contributed to marketing
theory. However, the group selected as the population is 
expected to be the major contributors. The greater the 
attempt to make marketing a science, the more this expecta­
tion appears to be true. The above beliefs are the reason 
for centering attention on the population chosen for this 
study.
All of the inherent limitations that exist in mail 
surveys were also a part of this study. However, a mail 
survey was the only realistic approach to sufficiently sample 
the population. One possible speculation about the sample 
is that those people most interested in marketing theory have 
tended to return the questionnaire while those people less 
interested have not. No attempt to measure the existence or 
extent of this bias was made. The special problems encoun­
tered with the questionnaire used for this study have been 
discussed in Chapter V, the initial chapter of primary re­
search .
One other major limitation of the study deals with the 
scholarly state of epistemology. Sub-hypothesis three in­
dicates that philosophers and other people interested in
4
epistemology are far from agreement on the proper approach.
4See for example: John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic,
Longmans, Green and Company, Ltd., London, England, 1961, 622 
pp.; Ludwig Von Mises, Epistemological Problems of Economics,
The unsettled state of this area has been discussed in the 
third and fourth chapters of this paper.
DEFINITIONS OF TERMINOLOGY
The following definitions are the ones used throughout 
the paper. Specific deviations have been noted as they oc­
curred. Certain definitions that follow may be different 
from particular individual understandings of them. An at­
tempt has been made to keep such deviations as small as 
possible.
Methodology
Methodology has been classified as one of the three 
provinces of Philosophy. The other two areas of Philosophy 
have been labeled Metaphysics and Theory of Value. How­
ever, there is a large diversity of opinion. Those authors 
that bother to classify Philosophy into branches differ in 
determining how it should be split. Aesthetics and Ethics,
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey, 1960, 
239 pp.; and Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, 
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., New York, New York, 1961,
618 pp.
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These labels were selected from among many different 
possibilities. They are the ones used by; Brand Blanshard, 
"Philosophy," Collier * s Encyclopedia, Crowell Collier and 
Macmillan, Inc., New York, New York, 1966, Volume 18, 
pp. 702-703.
grouped under Theory of Value, are often considered separate­
ly.
The study of methodology covers the nature of knowledge. 
Those interested in methodology are less interested in the 
facts than how they were obtained. This area of study con-
C
sists of two parts called epistemology and logic.
Epistemology; This term deals with the basic methods 
used to attain knowledge and.the grounds for that knowledge. 
The proper source of knowledge and the concomitant question 
concerning the criteria for truth are important to those 
interested in epistemology. For example, the observation of 
facts is one source of knowledge. A philosopher interested 
in methodology and particularly in epistemology might ask if 
observation of facts is a proper source of knowledge, and 
whether such observed facts are a proper criteria for truth. 
The philosopher might object to this method of attaining 
knowledge on the basis of a difference between precepts and 
things. This difference exists whether the perceiver is a 
man or a machine. The person interested in epistemology may 
deal with this problem of observation in his search for an
6The problem of classification also occurs with the 
usage of the term methodology. Many authors refer to method­
ology as a sub-classification of Logic. In such context, 
its meaning is considerably narrowed relative to the usage 
intended above.
acceptable source of knowledge and criteria for truth.
Logic; The other branch of methodology is logic.
Logic is broadly defined as a study of valid forms of 
reasoning. Epistemology provides the starting point for 
scientific explanation by establishing rules for attaining 
facts or ultimate truths. These are the primary building 
blocks to be used in explaining a phenomenon. Logic des­
cribes how these blocks may be properly put together in 
order to accomplish the explanation.
Science and Scientific Explanation
A broad, but generally acceptable, definition of a 
science has been used in this dissertation. Science has been 
defined as "a connected and systematized body of truths 
possessing generality in form." This definition was the 
one used throughout the following discourse. Truth without 
generality is not a science, and neither can detached and 
disconnected generalized truths be considered a science.
The role of a scientist consist of explanation of exist­
ing phenomena and prediction of potential future phenomena. 
Both of these are achieved through understanding of the
7
John Neville Keynes, The Scope and Method of Political 
Economy, fourth edition, Kelley & Millman, Inc., New York,
New York, 1955, p. 150.
circumstances surrounding a particular phenomenon. Like­
wise, understanding is achieved in a science through the 
proper use of methodology. It is possible to separate 
scientific explanation into two components called explanans 
and explananda.8
Explanans; The explanans provide the primary informa­
tion and restrictions necessary to an explanation. Included 
in this definition are statements of antecedent conditions 
and existing laws or truths or facts needed to achieve ex­
planation .
Explanandum: The explananaum is the phenomenon to be
explained or predicted. It is logically derived from the 
explanans. Schematically, the process of scientific explana­
tion may be represented as follows:
(LOGIC)
EXPLANANS - ■ ■ EXPLANANDUM
Theory
A theory is an attempt at scientific explanation and 
may be identified by data contained in the explanans. If
ft
The terminology used here is the same as that used by 
Hempel and Oppenheim but broader meanings are intended. See 
Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, ”Studies in the Logic of 
Explanation," Philosophy of Science, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1948), 
pp. 135-175.
10
the facts contained in the explanans are not known to be 
true, the explanandum that results is a theory.9 This can 
occur in many different ways. Some of the possible elements 
in the explanans that cause the result to be a theory are 
the addition of an untested hypothesis, the addition of non- 
provable assumptions, and the replacement of general laws 
with other theories. The theory is still an attempt to ex­
plain or predict a phenomenon. While it may gain the 
stature of general law through a large amount of testing in 
the real world, a theory can never be completely proven by 
that method.
The explanans of a theory may also contain another sub­
group of statements that identifies nothing recognizable in 
real world experiences. These statements often use the 
limiting case of some observable process. Examples of this 
group are "vacuum" in physics, "perfect competition" in
Q
Often definitions of theory are not nearly so laborious. 
A good example occurs in the following quotation by: George 
Schwartz, Science in Marketing, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New 
York, New York, 1965, p. 7. "A theory can consist of a few 
or many verbal statements and/or numerical statements which 
describe the behavior of some marketing phenomenon by refer­
ence to other marketing phenomena. The purpose of a theory 
is to enable one to predict the behavior of this dependent 
phenomenon." The passage is an example of the use of theory 
in its loosest form. The goal is the same as in the above 
text, but it severely lacks structure in trying to attain 
results. The addition of structure to attempts at marketing 
theory is a major goal of this study.
11
economic theory, "gene" in biological theory, and "infinity" 
in mathematics. The inclusion in an explanan of such state­
ments is bound to have a limiting effect on the derived 
explanandum. While the limiting effect of this abstraction 
from reality is important to remember, it can also be a 
valuable aid in removing nuisance parameters from highly 
complex phenomena. Removing these parameters may permit 
those interested to concentrate on the truly important 
factors affecting a phenomenon.
Normative Science
The application of scientific principles to achieve 
ethical and moral ends is the essence of a normative science. 
It requires that the system of values to be applied be known 
and concrete in nature. Moral and ethical values differ 
between individuals, and if a system of values is not con­
crete, different interpretations may arise.
A normative science deals with the criteria of "what 
ought to be."10 The goal of a normative science is the 
establishment of ideals. Ethics is an example of a normative
^Keynes, op. cit., p. 34.
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science of special interest to philosophers, and welfare 
economics is an example of special interest to economists. 
Both are interested in the proper way (value judgment) to 
accomplish something.
Since a normative science deals with such variable in­
tangibles as morals and ethical values there may be some 
question as to why it has been labeled a science. But it 
must be remembered that a normative science uses all of the 
techniques of science in connection with the value judgments. 
In the world as it exists, a scientist (and especially a 
social scientist) must operate within a system of values if 
he is to operate at all.
Positive Science
In contrast to a normative science, a positive science 
is concerned only with things as they exist,- independent of 
any particular ethical position or normative judgment. It 
is the definition of a positive science that is usually 
given under the label of "science." The search for explana­
tion and prediction, for cause and effect, and for uniformi­
ties in nature are all similar and acceptable ways of 
describing the goal of a positive science. Facts are the 
primary tools of a positive science.
13
RESEARCH DESIGN
A combination of primary and secondary information was 
used in this study with the purpose of establishing the 
truth of falsity of the primary hypotheses {see p. 3) •
Each source of information was used to achieve different and 
separate goals. When these goals have been attained, com­
bined, and then analyzed, the degree of truth or falsity of 
the primary hypothesis has been determined.
Library or Secondary Research
The goal of research by this method was to illustrate 
the importance of epistemology in developing marketing theory. 
This goal could not have been achieved by strict reliance on 
marketing literature. In fact, very little has been written 
in marketing on epistemology. Moreover, most of the market­
ing literature on methodology gives but a superficial cover­
age to the scientific method. The only recourse left to 
perform this study is to seek information outside of the 
marketing literature. In doing so, an attempt has been made 
to draw from areas closely related to marketing*1 or from 
Philosophy, the original source of scholarly discourse on 
epistemology.
^Especially Economics.
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Existing literature on epistemology discusses its role 
in theory development. Since epistemology and theory have 
been defined as being separate from any given field of 
study-^, it is legitimate to apply the rules governing them 
to marketing. Then, it is also possible to extend the 
benefits and problems connected with epistemology into the 
area of marketing. The above stated goal of library research 
has been achieved if the study shows that epistemology is 
valuable in theory development.
Another purpose of secondary research also sheds light 
on the impact of the primary hypothesis. Sub-hypothesis 
three (p. 3) declares that the state of epistemology in most 
areas is somewhat unsettled. This unsettled nature of the 
area is the result of classical arguments that are not likely 
to be easily resolved. Secondary research efforts have sug­
gested how the arguments are going to effect application of 
epistemology to marketing.
Primary Research
The goal of the empirical investigation was to determine 
the familiarity of marketing scholars with epistemology.
12See pp. 7-9.
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This research took the form of a questionnaire survey mailed 
to a sample of the academic American Marketing Association 
members.
Population Selection: The population selected was used
because of its reasonably close match with a population de­
veloped as an ideal. If an ideal population existed, it 
would contain all of those persons that shall be formulating 
or teaching marketing theory in the near future. In order 
for a member of this ideal group to be prepared for formu­
lating or teaching marketing theory in the near future, he 
is reasonably expected to understand the intricate and com­
plex process of marketing, a  member of this ideal group is 
also expected to be familiar with existing marketing theory 
and to be at least somewhat familiar with attempts at theory 
formulation in areas outside of marketing.
The members of such an ideal population cannot be iso­
lated. The ideal population can only be estimated by ap­
proximating the characteristics of its members. One 
ready-made group whose characteristics do approximate those 
of the ideal group is the academic members of the American 
Marketing Association. This group is for the most part both 
familiar and interested in the process of marketing. It is 
also reasonable to expect that this group is fairly familiar
16
with marketing theory and theory in other areas. Certainly 
non-academic marketing people and non-members of the Ameri­
can Marketing Association have contributed significantly to 
marketing theory and are expected to again. But in order to 
narrow the population to a workable size, and to isolate as 
much as possible the group with the most influence on 
marketing theory, only academic American Marketing Associ­
ation members were used.
Sample Size; The following terminology has been used 
in the discussion on sample size.
Np = population-*-3 = 1116
Ng = overall number of questionnaires sent = 400
n = small sample of questionnaires sent = 40
Xg = total questionnaires returned = 124
x = small sample returns = 13
z = standard normal deviate
P = population proportion
p = sample proportion
Sp = estimated standard error of the proportion 
The determination of representative sample was compli­
cated by several factors. One problem was the unusual nature 
of the questionnaire. It was easy to speculate that a ques­
tionnaire which tested the sample, rather than just asked 
for opinions from the sample, would not be returned to any 
significant degree.
4 ^
JSee: Membership Roster of the American Marketing
Association, Chicago: American Marketing Association,
January 1, 1967, pp. 188-192.
17
In order to estimate expected return, a small pre-test 
sample (n) was selected. The selection was made randomly 
from the total population (Np). its size (n = 40) was 
primarily limited by costs incurred related to possible 
benefits derived. The expected return sought is the per­
centage return which would occur if questionnaires were sent 
to the entire population (P). It was expected that some 
larger mailing, less than the size of the population, was 
also expected to experience a similar return (P) if it were 
selected at random from the population (N ). The pre-test
tr
yielded a 32.5% return (p = = °*325 « 32.5%). In
order to make predictions about the population from this 
sample, it has been assumed that the sample proportions are 
normally distributed. This assumption is approximately true 
because of the statistical phenomenon commonly known as the 
"Centeral Limit Theorm."^ of course, the best estimate of
14The equation representing some level of confidence 
about the value of the percentage return from the population 
(P) is:
P &  p - zsp
(for small samples)
— / (.325) (.~675) 
V 4 0 - 1
V. 00513
= 0.072
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percentage return of the population (P) is the sample 
return ( p = 32.5%). The estimates of population return 
seemed adequate enough to continue with a larger sample.
The next problem to be analyzed was the relation of 
actual responses on an individual question to hypothetical 
responses by the entire population on that question. That 
is, to what extent can the results of the sample be applied 
to the entire population? The validity of this kind of 
extrapolation can be calculated if two assumptions are 
granted. These assumptions are questionable, however. The 
first assumption deals with the sampling of human beings 
in general. Sampling techniques and statistical inference 
are typically built around stable populations with
At 90.0% confidence, z = 1.28 (one tail test) and,
p  ^  p _ ZSp
P >  0.325 - (1.28)(0.072)
P i  0.325 - 0.092 
P i  0.213 or 21.3%
At 70.0% confidence, z = 0.53 (one tail test) and, 
P i p -  zsp
P i  0.325 - (0.53) (0.072)
P i  0.325 - 0.038 
P i  0.287 or 28.7%
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discernible and measurable traits. Human beings exhibit 
neither of these characteristics. A more serious problem 
occurs because of the non-respondents. Statements of con­
fidence about population characteristics extrapolated from 
a sample requires that the sample be random. If non­
respondents differ in some important way from those that do
respond, then even a totally random mail-out yields a biased
15non-random return. ^
The first of the above objections can be satisfied by
limiting the results of the study to the time at which the
questionnaires were returned and by assuming that academic
people, not asked to divulge their name, had filled out the
questionnaire as honestly as possible. The second of the
above objections is not nearly as easily handled. It is
quite probable that bias does exist due to the attitudes of
non-respondents. While it is statistically possible to
quiz the non-respondents in order to determine the extent 
16of this bias, it is not economically feasible. The
15Morris H. Hanson, William N. Hurwitz, and William G. 
Madow, Sample Survey Methods and Theory, Volume I, New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1953, pp. 69-71.
•^One method for dealing with non-respondents is double 
sampling. See for example: Hanson, 0£. cit., pp. 473-475.
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problem can be attacked another way, however. It requires 
reasoning into the type of person that would respond and 
the type of person that would not respond. The author 
postulates that there was a greater tendency for those 
people with some background in methodology to return the 
questionnaire due to their greater interest and understand­
ing. If that is so, then the results of the study signify 
a greater understanding of methodology and epistemology 
than actually exists in the population. If in spite of 
this, problems of understanding in the area have been dis­
covered, then useful conclusions can be drawn. If the re­
sults indicate a high degree of knowledge in the area, they 
are less useful because of the bias.17
1 7The following calculations represent what the results 
would indicate if the returns were a truly random sample. In 
making these calculations, the universe of all similar sized 
samples is assumed to be normally distributed. The power of 
the centeral limit theorm makes this assumption approximately 
true.
sP
p = the percentage of responses giving one 
specific answer to any given question
q = (1.00 - p)
The values p and q will vary from response to response and 
from question to question. In order to generalize Sp, the 
product p times q has been given its maximum value in the
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If there were not the problem with randomness, the
results of the sample were quite adequate for predicting
the responses of the population. A seven or eight percent
difference is not serious in seeking the kind of information
desired from this study (i.e., information from which broad
generalizations can be drawn). The sample Xs represents a
31.0% response to the overall number of questionnaires sent
(Ng = 400; percent return = 100 times xs ).
Ns
following calculations. Thu3, sp and the confidence limits 
calculated using sp will probably be somewhat larger than 
necessary. The difference should not be excessive, es­
pecially when considered in the light of the two major prob­
lems discussed above.
sr = /CO.25)(1116 - 124)V (124)(115)
= 7(0725) (992) ~
Y (124)(115)
= -/0.001797_
= 0.0424
The range for the population proportion (P): 
with 95% confidence (z - 1.96 for two tail test) is
P ± zsp
P ± (1.96)(0.0424) 
p * 0.0831 or p i  8.31% 
with 90% confidence (z = 1.65 for two tail test) is
p ± (1.65)(0.0424) 
p ± 0.0700 or p 4 7.00%
Preparation of Questionnaire: The final state of the
questionnaire was for the most part that of multiple choice 
q u e s t i o n s . O n e  of the prime reasons for using this ap­
proach was the ease with which respondents could answer the 
questions. The difficulty of the questions made the simpli­
city of form especially important. Another reason for using 
this approach was the minimal interpretation of responses 
for categorization that was required.
The quality of the questions was pre-tested formally 
twice. The first pre-test occurred at what turned out to 
be an intermediate stage of development for the question­
naire. It was conducted among doctoral graduate students 
in marketing at Louisiana State University. Valuable in­
formation for further development was obtained. The 
second formal pre-test occurred when forty questionnaires 
were sent to members of the population (n). These responses 
led to a minor change in the wording of one question and the 
format of possible answers for that same question.
See Appendix A.
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REPORT PREVIEW
The body o£ this paper was constructed in two basic 
parts. Part one includes Chapters II through IV. An 
intermediate summary of conclusions has been included as 
the last section of Chapter IV so that the goal of the 
first part was properly emphasized. The purpose of the 
first part was to establish the importance of epistemology 
in developing a science and the need for marketing scholars 
to understand epistemological problems. This first part 
has attempted to satisfy sub-hypotheses one and three.
The role and importance of epistemology in marketing 
were analyzed in Chapter II. The importance or value of 
epistemology was determined to be the efficiency it ex­
hibited in aiding the development of science in marketing 
and the desirability of establishing science in marketing. 
The efficiency of epistemology was determined to be rep­
resented by the effectiveness of the role it plays and its 
ability to aid in overcoming the special problems of de­
veloping science in marketing. The desirability of develop­
ing science in marketing is a value-oriented judgment that 
must be made, either overtly or covertly, to determine the 
value of epistemology.
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Chapter III was used to examine the two sources of 
knowledge. Each source was defined, and the basis for its 
existence was analyzed. Characteristics about the sources 
and their role in developing theory were examined. In 
Chapter IV, problems connected with the two sources were 
analyzed. Each source was found to be less than fully ac­
cepted as a criterion for truth. Conclusions for the 
marketing theorist were developed in the chapter. The last 
section was devoted to summarizing the conclusions of the 
first part of the study.
The second part of this study dealt with the primary 
research conducted in order to fully satisfy sub-hypotheses 
one and two. It included Chapters V and VI. Chapter V was 
presented to examine the personal background of the res­
pondents. Data which appeared related to characteristics 
of the ideal population were given special emphasis. The 
analysis of the respondents' answers to the questions on 
methodology was the primary purpose of Chapter VI. The re­
sults of each question were individually analyzed, and 
certain cross-classifications were given when deemed 
significant.
Chapter VII is the conclusions and recommendations 
chapter. Included in the chapter are a restatement of the
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hypothesis, a summary of conclusions, and recommendations 
for improving marketing theory.
CHAPTER II
THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF EPISTEMOLOGY IN MARKETING
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the value 
of epistemology to marketing. The importance or value of 
epistemology to marketing lies in the aid it is capable of 
providing to the development of science in marketing. Ac­
complishment of this chapter's purpose is of major impor­
tance to the primary hypothesis. The primary hypothesis 
of this investigation states that a better approach to 
developing marketing theory can be produced through study 
of the method and grounds of knowledge (epistemology). * 
Theory is at the conceptual heart of science. Aiding the 
development of science automatically aids the development 
of the component of science in marketing which is theory.
^See Chapter I, p. 7.
Theory is defined in Chapter I (p. 9) as "an attempt 
at scientific explanation,” and explanation is the major 
goal of science. Theory then is a tool by which science 
attempts to achieve its goal. The Chapter I definition is 
broad enough to include the various degrees of theory ac­
ceptance known as hypotheses, principles, and laws.
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The value or importance of epistemology to the develop­
ment of science in marketing is a function of at least two 
variables, namely: (1) the efficiency of epistemology in
developing science and (2) the desirability of science in 
marketing. The efficiency of epistemology is defined as 
how well it can perform the task of aiding the development 
of theory and science.
Efficiency is dealt with in the following section 
which contains a discussion of the effectiveness of episte­
mology and of the major problems of developing science in 
marketing. The desirability of making marketing a science 
is the topic of the second section. The benefits and prob­
lems connected with science in marketing are discussed, and 
then the existing trend toward the development of science 
in marketing is outlined.
EFFICIENCY OF EPISTEMOLOGY FOR DEVELOPING SCIENCE
IN MARKETING
The task of this section is to determine the efficiency 
of epistemology in the development of science in marketing.
To accomplish the task, the direct effectiveness of episte­
mology in science development is established. Next, the 
special problems connected with developing science in 
marketing are illustrated. The effectiveness of epistemology
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for developing science in marketing is directly related to 
the outcome of these two discussions.
Effectiveness of Epistemology in Developing 
Science
The effectiveness of epistemology in developing science 
is dealt with in the following two sub-sections. Episte­
mology is neither a panacea or something to be overlooked 
when developing a science.
Epistemology and Nonsuccess in Science Development: A
relationship of primary importance occurs between epistemolo­
gy and methodology. This relationship is definitional, and 
general discussions on methodology also include implications
3
for epistemology. Many of the following comments are about 
methodology rather than epistemology, but their 4-ropact on 
epistemology is similar to that on the broader category.
Because of the strong bonds between methodology and 
science, some scholars have incorrectly equated success in 
the former with success in the latter.4 However, scientific 
methodology is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition 
for a successful scientific endeavor. Max Weber has stated
3See Chapter I, p. 7.
4See "The Myth of Methodology" in: Abraham Kaplan,
The Conduct of Inquiry, San Francisco: Chandler Publishing
Company, 1964, pp. 24-27.
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his views on the subject in the following manner;
(The study of methodology) can only bring us re­
flective understanding of the means which have 
demonstrated their value in practice by raising 
them to the level of explicit consciousness; it 
is no more than a precondition of fruitful intel­
lectual work than the knowledge of anatomy is the 
precondition for correct walking.5
Nevertheless, explicit consciousness about anatomy can aid 
posture in walking. Similarly, explicit knowledge about 
methodology, and particularly epistemology, can be a signifi­
cant aid to successful scientific endeavor. Kaplan states,
t
"I believe that the most important contribution methodology 
can make to science is, in Peirce's phrase, to help unblock 
the roads of inquiry."6
Epistemology as an Aid in Developing a Science; What
then is the particular relationship between methodology and
science? Methodology is the one unifying element common
to all branches of science.
The field of science is unlimited: its material is
endless, every group of natural phenomena, every 
phase of social life, every stage of past or present 
development is material for science. The unity of 
all science consists alone in its method, not in 
its materia lT?
^Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, 
Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1949, p. 115.
6Kaplan, C£. cit., p. 24.
^Karl Pearson, The Grammer of Science, third edition, 
London; Adam and Charles Black, 1911, p. 12.
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This unification occurs through the universal application 
of a broadly defined method of science.
The universally accepted method of science is de-
O
pendent upon a sound epistemology. Specifically, episte­
mology is defined as dealing with the means used to attain 
knowledge and the grounds for that knowledge. Scholarly 
efforts in epistemology are directed in search for the 
nature and criterion of truth. But science was briefly de­
fined as a body of truths, and scientists have devoted 
their efforts to discovering truths or developing theories 
about truths, A sound epistemology can then be a valuable 
guide to scientists. It can provide a sounding board where 
scientists may test their theories for validity.
As an example of the role of epistemology in science, 
suppose that the only accepted source of knowledge by the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (N.A.S.A.) 
is observation. N.A.S.A. desires to develop a science of 
space travel. A theory about the affects of space flight 
on the mental capabilities of astronauts is developed. For 
this theory to become part of the "science" of space travel, 
it must be tested and the results observed under conditions
8Note the definition of methodology and epistemology 
in Chapter I, pp. 6-7.
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of space flight. The truth of the theory is not accepted 
until the epistemological requirement of observation is 
met. Until the truth of the theory is accepted, it can not 
be added to that "body of truths" which is defined as 
science.® In summary, while individual scientific successes 
may be achieved without the development of a sound episte­
mology, establishing a field as a highly scientific area may 
require that a valid epistemology exists. A valid episte­
mology then becomes a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for success.
Problems with Development of Science in Marketing
The second aspect of determining the efficiency that 
epistemology exhibits in developing science in marketing is 
discussed in this section. The aspect of efficiency investi­
gated here is the specific problems that tend to inhibit 
science development in marketing. These problems are 
special barriers to the smooth performance of epistemology 
suggested in the preceding section.
In a 1951 article, Robert Bartels stated that "Interest 
in the development of a broader science of marketing is in 
part the result of the appearance of marketing problems which
^Definition of science, Chapter I, p. 8.
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the present body of knowledge is incapable of s o l v i n g . " ^
The problems still exist and are becoming more acute. The 
problems faced by marketing are typically the same ones 
faced by all of the social sciences. Some of these problems 
apply more accutely to marketing than to other areas, and 
an attempt was made to isolate those problems for discussion 
in this section.
Predictability of Human Behavior; A primary problem 
faced by marketing scientists probes into the nature of 
mgin's decision-making process. This process determines 
man's actions and reactions, and the explanation of human 
action is a major goal of marketing science. The unpre­
dictability of man's decision-making process causes prob­
lems in developing a science about human action. The 
development of a science requires that its interacting ele­
ments do not occur at random. Adherence to one approach 
for scientific development requires that the object of that 
development be somewhat mechanistic in nature. If the ob­
ject is totally mechanistic, then cause and effect can be 
established, facts or truths can be determined, and
10Robert Bartels, "Can Marketing be a Science," Jour­
nal of Marketing, XV (January, 1951), 326.
explanation is possible. If the object is totally unmech- 
anistic (actions occur freely and randomly), cause and 
effect and explanation are meaningless. Using purely a 
priori knowledge, man's process of decision-making can be 
placed somewhere between totally mechanistic and totally 
unmechanistic. Then to the extent that man's process of 
decision-making is other than mechanistic, totally reli­
able scientific explanation can not be achieved. Con­
versely, to the extent that man's process of decision-making 
is mechanistic, this problem is no barrier to scientific 
explanation in marketing.
The solution to this problem lies in the approach to 
science in marketing, not in its object —  man. The 
solution is not likely to be completely satisfactory to 
marketing scientists. If the a priori statement on classi­
fication of the human decision-making process is correct, 
then it is improbable that science in marketing will ever 
achieve the level of efficiency that exists in the physical 
sciences. Statements of explanation or prediction in the 
physical sciences are given high probabilities, but the 
degree of randomness in human behavior places a much lower 
ceiling on the probability of particular occurrences in 
marketing. Their lower probability of occurrence is an 
annoyance, but it does not render such statements useless
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any more than the relatively low probability of a weather 
forecast renders it useless. As in the weather forecast, 
statements on human action with lower probabilities than 
desirable can still be the basis for decision-making and 
planning. They are eminently better than other alterna­
tives .
Controlled Inquiry in Marketing: This section is used
to investigate whether the inability of marketing to con­
duct controlled experiments has a serious effect on its 
capability of becoming a science.'*'^ precisely controlled 
experiments like those in physics and chemistry do not 
occur in marketing. One reason for the nonoccurrence is 
that marketing men do not usually possess the power to 
change social situations in order to satisfy the require­
ments of such an experiment. For example, Nagel points 
out that:
In a controlled experiment, the experimenter can 
manipulate at will, even if only within limits, 
certain features in a situation (often designated 
as "variables" or "factors") which are assumed to 
constitute the relevant condition for the occur­
rence of the phenomena under study. . . .-*-2
13-Many of the ideas for the remaining discourse on 
"Problems with Development of Science in Marketing" come 
from: Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961, pp. 450-459.
^Ibid., pp. 450-451.
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This manipulation is often not possible when the object of 
an experiment is a human.
Even if the power to manipulate humans prevailed, two 
other problems connected with controlled experimentation in 
marketing exist. First, in an experiment using knowledge­
able beings as subjects, that experiment becomes a social 
variable. If a subject knows that he is participating in 
an experiment, he may alter his normal behavior. Second, 
experiment repetition may be impossible. Irreversible 
modification in the social milieu may be caused by the 
introduction of experimental change and the ensuing results 
of that change. The inability to produce repeated modifi­
cations in a social experiment severely limits the value of 
experimentation in marketing.
In the face of these problems certain saving facts 
exist. Controlled experimentation is not a "sine qua non" 
for establishing comprehensive systems of explanation in 
marketing. Several existing sciences are not experimental. 
This group includes astronomy, astrophysics, and geology.
Also, something akin to a controlled experiment often 
occurs naturally. It is the job of the investigator to 
isolate these instances of contrasting inputs and record 
the resultant outputs. The results approach those of a con­
trolled experiment. However, Nagel differentiates this 
approach from controlled experimentation by labeling it
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controlled investigation.Nagel's controlled investiga­
tion is an extension of what is commonly known as ex post 
facto research but is broader in scope. Kerlinger defines 
ex post facto research as follows:
Ex post facto research may be defined as that re­
search in which the independent variable or vari­
ables have already occurred and in which the 
researcher starts with the observation of a de­
pendent variable or variables. He then studies 
the independent variables in retrospect for their 
possible relations to, and effects on, the de­
pendent variable or v a r i a b l e s .
Nagel's controlled investigation involves the comparison of
several ex post facto investigations.
One other point is important to the cited problems of
controlled experimentation in marketing. Marketing does
15use experimentation. While the experiments are not con­
trollable in the same sense that physical science experi­
ments may be, they significantly offset the problems cited 
in this section. Boyd and Westfall center their discussion
13Ibid., pp. 452-453.
14Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research, 
New York; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964, p. 360.
15Several marketing research texts discuss experimenta­
tion in marketing. The following two are cited for their 
exceptional handling of the topic: Harper W. Boyd and
Ralph Westfall, Marketing Research, Homewood, Illinois: 
Richard D. Irwin, 1956, pp. 79-113; Seymour Banks, Experi­
mentation in Marketing, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965, 275 pp.
of experiments in marketing around six types. They label 
them the Before-After Design, the Before-After with Control 
Group Design, the Four-Group —  Six Study Design, the After 
Only with Control Group Design, the Ex Post Facto Design 
(discussed above), and the Panel Design. The use of con­
trol groups is prominent in the various designs. They are 
used to help eliminate the effect of irreversible modifica­
tion of the social milieu. Also, the use of control groups 
can reduce the effect of the experiment as a social variable.
The problems connected with controlled experimentation 
in marketing reduce the probability that this area can be­
come as scientific as the physical sciences. However, these 
problems have not eliminated marketing as a potential science. 
They have only added to the challenge.
Knowledge of Theory in Marketing as a Variable; Once 
theories in marketing become known among the people affected 
by them, those theories become variables. The knowledge of 
a theory in marketing influences the very behavior that the 
theory attempts to predict. People react according to the 
behavior predicted by the theory. The result of the reaction 
may be to completely invalidate the conclusions of highly 
competent inquiry. Two well known types of social predic­
tions (theories) can be distinguished. They are "the suici­
dal prediction" and "the self-fulfilling prophecy." Both
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illustrate what knowledge of a prediction can do to compe­
tently established theory.
Once a suicidal prediction is known, that very know­
ledge prohibits the fulfillment of the prediction. The 
following example is used to illustrate the operation of 
suicidal predictions. In a hypothetical situation, a 
teacher predicts that a student will not graduate because 
of a lack of ability. This prediction is based on compe­
tent observation of the student and from existing I.Q. 
scores. Upon learning of the teacher's prediction, the 
student compensates for his deficiencies in ability with 
enough hard work to graduate. If this occurs, the teacher's 
prediction was suicidal because the knowledge of that pre­
diction caused its failure.
The second type of social prediction or theory that can 
invalidate competent prior conclusions is called the self- 
fulfilling prophecy. In this instance, the results of any 
initially valid inquiries are not known or at least not 
accepted. Rather, the self-fulfilling prophecy usually 
starts with initially unsound predictions. If the unin­
formed prediction is then accepted by the proper people, 
the prediction is fulfilled. As an illustration of the 
self-fulfilling prophecy, the hypothetical student-teacher
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situation can again be used. Suppose that an uninformed 
teacher predicts that a competent student does not have the 
ability to graduate. Upon learning of the prediction the 
student becomes despondent, gives up, and fails out of 
school. The teacher's prophecy was self-fulfilling because 
the knowledge of that prophecy caused its fulfillment. 
Another often used example of this phenomenon occurs when a 
"run" is experienced by a financially sound bank. In this 
instance, the prophecy is usually that the bank will fail 
for financial reasons even though it actually is sound by 
banking standards. Upon hearing the prediction, depositors 
attempt to withdraw their funds all at once. Even sound 
banks can not provide large quantities of liquidity in the 
short time interval involved. The prophecy is then proved 
true because the bank is forced into bankruptcy.
The impact of prior theory knowledge on the development 
of science in marketing can be offset. The compensating 
factor lies in the nature of theory statements. Operational 
statements of marketing theory are typically conditional, 
and conditional statements can be formulated to include the 
effect of knowledge. The conditional statement makes 
marketing theory generally less powerful, harder to under­
stand, and can eliminate it from practical usage. The
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problem is one of degree and is not likely to stop the 
development of science in marketing. The existence of this 
problem has only created additional difficulties for de­
veloping that science.
Value-Oriented Bias in Marketing: The comments in this
study are based on the premise that a positive rather than 
normative approach to marketing is possible. A positive 
science deals with facts while a normative science must 
satisfy value-oriented problems. This section deals with 
the question of whether value-oriented bias can be eliminat­
ed from inquiries in marketing.
The argument exists that fact and value in the social 
sciences are impossible to separate.^ The proponents of 
the argument feel that value judgments must enter into all 
human statements. Even apparent statements of fact or 
descriptive statements include elements of value-oriented 
bias according to these proponents. The reasons given for 
the viewpoint center strictly around the nature of human 
behavior. The source of knowledge about value-oriented bias 
appears to be observation on the part of those persons that
16See for an example: Leo Strauss, "The Social Science
of Max Weber," Measure, II (1951), 211-214.
believe fact and value can not be separated. If their 
argument is true, then marketing can not be a completely 
positive science because all scientific statements in 
marketing have elements of value-oriented bias.
The question has been argued pro and con, but neither 
side was satisfactorily proven true.1^ One approach to 
solving the dilemma may be for scientists in marketing to 
be as positive as possible in their approach. To the ex­
tent that value-oriented bias still exists, marketing is 
shifted from a positive toward a normative science. The 
end effect may not be a serious barrier to the development 
of science in marketing. Many of the appraising value 
judgments that social scientists are accused of commiting 
are also common to the physical sciences.18 The effect 
has not prevented the physical sciences from developing to 
any significant degree.
17A stimulating exchange on the subject as it pertains 
to the philosophy of Law occurred in the following articles 
Lon Fuller, "Human Purpose and Natural Law," Natural Law 
Forum, III (1958), 68-76; Ernest Nagel, "On the Fusion of 
Fact and Value: A Reply to Professor Fuller," oj>. cit., pp. 
77-82; Lon Fuller, "A Rejoiner to Professor Nagel," op. 
cit., pp. 83-104; also see Ernest Nagel, "Fact, Value, and 
Human Purpose," Natural Law Forum, IV (1959), 26-43.
I Q
See the discussion by: Ernest Nagel, The Structure
of Science, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961, p. 
494.
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Cultural Relativity: Both national and international
cultures have a significant effect on the environment of 
marketing. Social behavior is apparently a function of 
culturally instituted impulses as well as the stimulus of 
the immediate situation. Culturally determined differences 
among people seems to limit the possibility of generaliza­
tion on human behavior. Moreover, individual cultures are' 
extremely difficult to isolate as they often include large 
gray areas. Even more specifically, the effect of partici­
pation in a given culture is likely to elicit dissimilar 
actions from the participants. The effects of the culture 
are not homogeneous.
One potential solution to the problem is the derivation 
of transcultural theories. The wide differences in specific 
cultural traits and the high degree of similarities within 
given cultural systems do not exclude the possibility of a
I Q
single theory about those systems. Bartels states that
"marketing is a universal phenomenon, carried on . . .  in a 
manner indigenous to the environment of the culture in which
^■^Ernest Nagel, 0£. cit., p. 462, discusses this point 
as it generally applies to the social sciences. But comments 
on the subject that are more specifically directed to 
marketing theory are part of an article by: Robert Bartels,
"The General Theory of Marketing," Journal of Marketing,
XXXII (January, 1969), 29-33.
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20it occurs." However, in the same article one of his 
primary propositions is that "a contemporary general theory 
of marketing is implicit in a sufficiently broad concept of 
marketing.1,21 Bartels' "General Theory of Marketing" is 
then a transcultural theory. Transcultural theory is of 
necessity highly abstract, but this abstraction does not 
keep it from being useful.
This section has presented several difficult problems 
that must be solved if marketing is to become a science.
Each problem was accompanied by a tentative solution. While 
these solutions illustrate a way of overcoming the problems, 
the problems have not been eliminated. Also, other problems 
exist that may become more formidable than they now appear. 
The result is that while nothing now seems to be an absolute 
styme to the development of science in marketing, the future 
of the effort can not be predicted. The following quotation 
by George Schwartz summarizes the status of science in 
marketing:
20Bartels, 0£. cit., p. 31. 
21Ibid., p. 32.
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Since acceptable proof of the possibility or impos­
sibility of developing a science of marketing has 
not yet been forthcoming, one might suggest that 
we will know whether such a feat is possible only 
when success is attained in obtaining the know­
ledge which meets the requirements of a science.
DESIRABILITY OP SCIENCE IN MARKETING
The discourse in this section is used to establish some 
of the benefits derived from marketing becoming a science and 
to illustrate some of the possible normative objections to 
that path. The section also deals briefly with existing 
marketing trends toward science. The net purpose is to 
determine the desirability of science in marketing.
Favorable Aspects of Science in Marketing
Many people find satisfaction in science because they
believe in the existence of an intrinsic value of knowledge.
Madden expresses that viewpoint as follows: " . . .  Science,
like any other study, is intrinsically valuable because it
produces knowledge —  something which is valuable in and of
23itself independently of what we can do with it." The
human trait that gave birth to the intrinsic value of
22George Schwartz, Science in Marketing, New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1965, p. 1.
23Edward H. Madden, The Structure of Scientific Thought, 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961, p. 367.
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knowledge is the desire for beauty, and knowledge of many 
of the worldly phenomena was considered beautiful. The 
eloquent passage that follows shows recognization of the 
existence of this aspect of knowledge and illustrates its 
origin.
Science in its beginnings was due to men who were 
in love with the world. They perceived the beauty 
of the stars and the sea, of the winds and the 
mountains. Because they loved them their thoughts 
dwelt upon them, and they wished to understand 
them more intimately than a mere outward contempla­
tion made possible. ^
The shift from infatuation with the beauty of knowledge to
the impersonal application of knowledge to everyday prob­
lems was gradual but decisive. Bertrand Russell summarizes 
the change in the following quotation.
But step by step, as science developed, the im­
pulse of love which gave it birth has been in­
creasingly thwarted, while the impulse of power, 
which was at first a mere camp-follower, has 
gradually usurped command in virtue of its un­
foreseen success. The lover of nature has been
baffled, the tyrant over nature has been re­
warded. ^ 5
From a more practical viewpoint, three interrelated 
goals of science are important to marketing. The goals are 
explanation, prediction, and control. The latter two can be
^Bertrand Russell, The Scientific Outlook, New York:
W. W. Norton, 1931, p. 262.
25Ibid., p. 263
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satisfied if the former, explanation, is achieved. The 
importance of explanation to science is great, and in some 
cases the two are considered to be the same thing. This 
role of explanation in science is illustrated in the follow­
ing quotation.
To explain the phenomena in the world of our ex­
perience, to answer the question "Why?" rather 
than only the question "what?", is one of the 
foremost objectives of all rational inquiry; and 
especially, scientific research in its various 
branches strives to go beyond a mere description 
of its subject matter by providing an explanation 
of the phenomena it investigates.26
Further emphasis on the role of explanation in science is
given by a statement of Ernest Nagel.
It is the desire for explanations which are at 
onqe systematic and controllable by factual evi­
dence that generates science; and it is the organ­
ization and classification of knowledge on the 
basis of explanatory principles that is the dis­
tinctive goal of the sciences.
Explanation, prediction, and control can benefit 
marketing. The marketing practitioner, teacher, student, re­
search analysts, and possibly the consumer benefits with the 
achievement of these goals. To the marketing practitioner,
26Carl G. Heropel and Paul Oppenheim, "Studies in the 
Logic of Explanation," Philosophy of Science, XV (April, 
1948), 135.
27Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, New York: 
Barcourt. Brace and world, 1961, p. 4.
47
the ability of prediction and control greatly reduces the 
risk of uncertainty. The marketing teacher and student"have 
"a connected and systemized body of truths possessing gener­
ality in form"28 that facilitates the teaching and learning 
of the subject. Also, the marketing research analyst de­
sires that marketing be made a science so that he may have 
a coherent body of theory to direct his investigations. The 
consumer is the one person to which the benefits derived 
from making marketing scientific are offset with some im­
pressive disadvantages. Advantages do still exist. With 
marketing more scientific its efficiency is improved. This 
improvement drives down the price of goods in general. Also, 
the type of good that the consumer desires is easier to 
determine and provide. Many similar technical benefits 
accrue to the consumer but not without cost. This cost is 
normative rather than positive in nature and is discussed in 
the following section.
Encroachment of Human Privacy
Offsetting the benefits of scientific marketing is the 
problem on encroachment of human privacy. The encroachment
28Definition of science. Chapter I, p. 8.
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occurs because a large amount of personal information about 
the consumer is needed in order to achieve explanation, 
prediction, and control of his purchasing actions. .The ac­
cumulation of aggregate figures is not sufficient to accom­
plish the task. Individualistic figures are also needed as 
evidenced by experiences in other scientific areas. Bio­
logists study the individual cell before making statements 
about groups of cells. Chemists evaluate the properties of 
a molecule of a substance before making statements about 
that substance in general. Similarly, physicists search 
for the structure of an atom before making predictions about 
groups of like atoms. In order to explain the actions of 
any system, a thorough knowledge of the elements that make 
up that system is highly desirable. The: more exact the ex­
planation required, the more individualized the information 
needed by a scientist.
The consumer is the center of attention in a marketing 
system. As a human, the consumer may object to a marketing 
scientist treating him in the same manner that other 
scientists treat cells, molecules, and atoms. The infringe­
ment upon human privacy thus creates a normative problem. 
This infringement makes the desirability (value judgment) of 
developing science in marketing questionable.
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The problem of encroachment: on human privacy may ulti­
mately provide the critical constraint that stops market­
ing's movement towards developing a science. Until that 
point is reached, marketing can make good use of aggregate 
figures and those individualistic figures which exist.
What occurs after man puts a stop to the encroachment re­
mains to be seen.
Marketing * s Move Toward Science
The desirability of developing marketing into a science 
is tempered by what progress has been made to this point in 
time. Recent occurrences in the field of marketing illus­
trate interest in the scientific development of the area.29 
;
Buzzell believes that the most noteworthy occurrence was 
the establishment of the Marketing Science Institute in 1962. 
The organization is dedicated to fundamental research in 
marketing, and it is supported by 29 large corporations. 
Another major development has been the commitment of the
American Marketing Association to the "advancement of science
30in marketing." Buzzell also mentions several recent books
2 9These occurrences were taken from an article by:
Robert D. Buzzell, "Is Marketing a Science?", Harvard Busi­
ness Review, XLI (January-February, 1963), 32-33.
3 0Printed on their current membership certificates.
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that are concerned with the development of science in
31marketing as an illustration of interest in the area.
Split in Marketing Over Usefulness of Science: The
development of science in marketing has been met with skep­
ticism by practitioners. Buzzell states that " . . .  when 
executives are asked to consider the social and economic 
process of marketing as a science or prospective science, 
most confess to extreme skepticism."32 This skepticism has 
tended to keep executives from using scientific methods in 
their marketing decision making. Gradually a split between 
practitioner and academician developed over the use of 
scientific methods in marketing. The following quotation 
illustrates how one person analyzes the cause and severity 
of the split.
. . .  none of these executives would describe their 
intuitive process for reaching decisions as being 
attenuated. Thus, they are forced into the posi­
tion of being antiscientific because scientific and
31Buzzell mentions the following texts: Robert Bartels, 
The Development of Marketing Thought, Homewood, Illinois: 
Richard D. Irwin, 1962, 284 pp.; Edward C. Bursk, Text and 
Cases in Marketing: A Scientific Approach, Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962, 580 pp.; and because of the 
several theory articles it contains: William Lazer and
Eugene Kelley (editors), Managerial Marketing: Perspectives
and Viewpoints, 3rd ed., Homewood, Illinois: Richard D.
Irwin, 1967, 764 pp.
32Buzzell, op. cit., p. 32.
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mathematical efforts to explain the marketing 
process tend to be superficial and attenuated 
—  not practical and powerful.
The split is really one between the intuitive process 
and the scientific process or between art and science. C.
P. Snow discusses what he labeled a cultural split not un­
like the division in marketing.34 His discussion indicates 
that perhaps the marketing problem is only part of a much 
broader division. According to Snow, western society is 
split into two groups. These two groups consist of the 
artistic or creative, and the scientific elements of society. 
It is Snow's view that the groups are totally intolerant of 
each other and understand little of the other's position.
Practitioner Acceptance; In spite of the split in 
marketing, executives must be practical to stay in business, 
and marketing men eventually use an. approach if it appears 
to be most profitable. Business management has already 
started to apply scientific techniques and employ greater 
money and effort to obtain more information for decision 
m a k i n g . Robert Ferber also acknowledges that fact in the
33Martin K. Starr, "Marketing Science and Management 
Science," Management Science, X (April, 1964), 559.
34C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revo­
lution, Mew York: Cambridge University Press, 1961.
35See Melvin Anshen, "Management Science in Marketing: 
Status and prospects," Management Science, II (April, 1956), 
223.
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following quotation.
The two most striking developments in marketing 
research in the past few years have been its 
widespread acceptance by business and its rapid 
technical progress. As might be expected, the 
simultaneous occurrence of the two developments 
has created an unprecedented demand for more 
knowledge.36
According to Anshen and Ferber some application of scienti­
fic techniques now exist in business. The application of 
scientific procedure in executive decision-making may signal 
the beginning of the end of the practitioner-academician 
division. If the end occurs, scientific techniques for ob­
taining knowledge appear able to at least partially replace 
intuition in executive decision-making. The end result may 
be a movement by marketing toward the establishment of 
science in the field.
The establishment of the Marketing Science Institute, 
the dedication of the American Marketing Association to 
science in marketing, the recent texts devoted to science 
and theory in marketing, and the possible demise of the split 
between academicians and practitioners all tend to indicate 
that a trend exists which points toward the development of 
science in marketing. The trend has developed to this stage
Robert Ferber, Marketing Research, New York; McGraw- 
Hill Book Company, 19 63, p. xiii.
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either because of or in spite of the desirability of 
science in marketing and seems likely to continue.
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
The purpose of this chapter was to establish the role 
and importance of epistemology in marketing. The importance 
or value of epistemology wds determined to be the aid it 
provided in developing science in marketing. Further, the 
value of epistemology was given as a function of (1) the 
efficiency it exhibits in developing science, and (2) the 
desirability of science in marketing. The purpose of the 
chapter was accomplished by analyzing these two aspects of 
epistemology.
The efficiency of epistemology in developing science 
represents the ability to accomplish this feat. Episte­
mology can benefit the development of science in marketing, 
but it is not a cure-all for the problems which are en­
countered. In addition to the normal problems faced by 
scientists in the physical sciences, marketing must solve 
several others. Most of these additional problems are the 
result of the fact that both the subject of the investiga­
tion and the investigator are human beings. While none of 
these problems eliminate the possibility of developing theory
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and science in marketing, they create many difficulties.
The conclusion on efficiency is that epistemology was de­
termined to be the source of knowledge upon which science 
is built. If marketing is to become scientific, the pos­
session of a sound epistemology by marketing scholars is 
a valuable asset.
Epistemology is important to science and theory, but 
is the development of science in marketing a desirable 
goal? Many people derive benefits from the development of 
marketing into a science. However, the consumer may pay a 
dear price for his benefits. The cost to the consumer is 
in terms of his privacy. Nevertheless, the existing trend 
in marketing is toward the development of theory and science 
in the area.
CHAPTER III
THE TWO SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the marketing 
scientist with adequate background information on available 
epistemological approaches. If the marketing scientist uses 
epistemology for developing a better approach to theory 
(primary hypothesis), he must be provided with the tools 
needed to accomplish the task. This chapter is an attempt 
at providing those tools.
There are two sources of knowledge from which any episte­
mology may draw. These two sources of knowledge are: (1)
that which is strictly a product of man's mind without re­
course to the human senses (a priori knowledge), and (2) 
that which is received through the human senses without re­
course to man's mental faculties except for perception (a 
posteriori knowledge). Basically, one source of knowledge 
relies totally on human perception for knowledge while the 
other claims that man's mind may generate truths without 
direct use of perception. An infinite combination of 
epistemologies may be generated by applying these two 
sources in different degrees. For that reason, an analysis
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of all epistemologi.es is impossible. A more reasonable 
approach to providing the marketing scientist with needed 
information on epistemology is to discuss the two possible 
sources of knowledge. The marketing scientist may then 
choose how he wishes to blend these sources in developing 
his particular epistemology.
The first major topic analyzed in this chapter is that 
of a priori knowledge. Two qualifying factors relative to 
the definition of this source are analyzed. These qualify­
ing factors are the role experience plays in a priori know­
ledge and the basis for its existence. Besides the 
qualifying factors, various characteristics of this source 
are examined. The characteristics include areas which ex­
hibit a high concentration of a priori knowledge, the fact 
that this source is either synthetic or analytic, the fact 
that knowledge occurs at two levels, and that a priori know­
ledge is always a universal relationship or property. The 
concluding discussion on a priori knowledge is an analysis 
of its role in theory development.
The next major topic discussed in this chapter is that 
of a posteriori knowledge. The source is defined and its 
relationship to inductive reasoning is analyzed in the first 
section of this part. The basis for empirical generaliza­
tions are investigated next. This investigation includes a
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discussion on the laws of nature, a description of universal 
causation, and an analysis of human belief in cause. The 
final discussion in this part is an examination of the role 
a posteriori knowledge plays in theory development.
A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE
The first potential source of knowledge analyzed in 
this chapter is that which is strictly a product of man's 
mind without recourse to perception. This kind of knowledge 
is known as a priori. In this case, the individual possesses 
a store of knowledge which was not previously available to 
him and that was totally generated by the mind. A priori 
knowledge may then be called that self-evident knowledge 
which is independent of experience.
The intent of this section is to provide an inquiry 
into the nature of a priori knowledge. Included in the in­
quiry are discussions on the function of experience in a 
priori knowledge, areas where this source is in high con­
centration, an analysis of its basis, various characteristics 
of its existence, and the role it plays in developing theory.
Function of Experience
The phrase "independent of experience" in the preceding 
definition of a priori knowledge needs to be qualified. Ex­
perience precedes all understanding, and in that sense, it
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is an integral part of all knowledge. Experience conies
first, then a priori knowledge appears. Locke states:
Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, 
white paper, void of all characters, without any 
ideas; how comes it to be furnished? . . .
Whence has it all the materials of reason and 
knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from 
experience; in that all our knowledge is founded, 
and from that it ultimately derives itself.^
Bertrand Russell concurs with Locke's view on the relation 
between universals and particulars. Russell states simply, 
"No fact concerning anything capable of being experienced 
can be known independent of experience."2 But even though 
human cognition begins with experience, it is not necessarily 
true that experience is the sole source of knowledge. Kant 
states, "But although all our cognition begins with experi­
ence, still on that account, all does not precisely spring 
out of experience." For example, a child may learn to 
count through a process that involves contact with physical 
objects. This "sense-experience" contact allows the child 
to develop a concept about numbers. The child learns the
*-John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Under standing, 
Boston: Cummings & Hilliard and J. T. Buckingham, 1813,
Vol. I, p. 96.
2Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 105.
^Immanuel Kant, Critik of Pure Reason, London: William 
Pickering, 1838, 655 pp.
meaning of “one," "two," "four," etc. But now suppose the 
child performs the arithmetic, two plus two equals four. 
While the concept of physical objects as numbers plays a 
part, the problem's solution can be seen through just the 
operation of thought. No contact is necessary with physi­
cal objects to perform the operation. Some philosophers 
would label knowledge of the problem's solution a priori 
knowledge. In that sense, the knowledge of the problem's 
solution is "independent of experience” and self-evident. 
The criteria for a priori knowledge have been satisfied.
The Basis for A Priori Knowledge
What is the basis for the phenomenon of a priori know­
ledge? How does a priori knowledge occur? The purpose of 
this section is to seek an answer to these questions. To 
accomplish the purpose, a discussion of innate ideas and a 
more accepted view are examined.
Innate Ideas as a Basis for A Priori Knowledge: Many
approaches and variations to the explanation of a priori 
knowledge have been elucidated. The concept of "innate 
ideas" as the source of a priori knowledge was highly prom­
inent at one time. Spinoza's doctrine, as furthered by
60
Descartes, was the groundwork used to develop this view.4
Locke describes the belief as follows:
It is an established opinion amongst men, that 
there are in the underb tanding certain innate 
principles some primary notions, characters as 
it were, stamped upon the mind of man, which 
the soul receives in its very first being, and 
brings into the world with it.6
But Locke also severely attacked the doctrine of innate ideas
as a preliminary act to the development of his own thesis.6
Leibniz critically evaluated Locke's Essay Concerning Human
Understanding from the point of view of rationalism and de-
7
fended the concept of "innate ideas" against Locke's attack. 
Rationalism may be defined broadly as the doctrine where 
reason only is the source of knowledge independent of the 
perception by our senses.
Philosophers since the time of the early Greeks have 
puzzled over the basis of a priori knowledge. In the early 
writings of Plato, he seemed highly perplexed on the subject. 
In an attempt to explain a priori knowledge, Plato invented 
a myth that the soul remembers visions from some life before
4Gutmann, op. cit., p. 113.
5Locke, 0£. cit., p. 42.
6Locke, 0£. cit., pp. 42-95.
^Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz, New Essays Concerning Human 
Understanding, Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company,
1916, 861 pp. The defense of innate ideas in Book I, pp. 
65-108.
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birth. This description resembles that of innate ideas. 
Plato wrote the following supposed dialogue between Socrates 
and Meno which refers to mathematical knowledge shown by 
one of Meno*s uneducated slaves.
Soc. But if he did not acquire the knowledge in
this life, then he must have had and learned 
it at some other time?
Men. Clearly he must.
Soc. Which must have been the time when he was
not a man?
Men. Yes.
Soc. And if there have been always true thoughts
in him, both at the time when he was and was
not a man, which only need to be awakened into 
knowledge by putting questions to him, his 
soul must have always possessed this know­
ledge, for he always either was or was not a 
man?
p
Men. Obviously.
The innate idea doctrine as the explanation of the basis for 
a priori knowledge is now somewhat out of vogue.
A More Accepted View on the Basis for A Priori Know­
ledge ; Philosophers, not so imaginative as Plato, view a 
priori knowledge as a product of man's mind apart from the 
physical world. Locke recognized the existence of a priori
Q
Plato, "Meno," The Dialogues of Plato (Book VII of the 
Great Books of the Western World, publisher William Benton, 
54 volumes, Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), pp.
182-183.
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knowledge and discussed it in detail. Locke felt that a
priori knowledge was freely generated by the mind through
a process he labeled "reflection."
This source of ideas every man has wholly in him­
self; and though it be not sense, as having nothing 
to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, 
and might properly enough be called internal sense 
. . .  I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords 
being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on 
its own operations within itself.9
This definition of a priori knowledge is compatible with
that which was given in the beginning of this section.
Characteristics of A Priori Knowledge
Several characteristics of a priori knowledge may be 
important to the marketing scientist. This section is 
primarily an analysis of these characteristics. They in­
clude the fact that certain areas contain high concentrations 
of a priori knowledge, that this source may be divided into 
synthetic and analytic, and that while knowledge occurs at 
two levels, a priori knowledge is always a universal rela­
tionship or property.
The discourse that follows represents some of the prom­
inent views on a priori knowledge. An attempt was made, in 
some cases, to generalize the viewpoints of several people
9Locke, op. cit., p. 97.
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under one lable. Such generalizations are risky because 
most individual beliefs are held to varying degrees and 
usually contain special stipulations which differ. In this 
section the common points of agreement are featured.
High Concentration Areas of A Priori Knowledgei While 
a priori knowledge may occur in any area of study, a charac­
teristic of this source is that certain branches of knowledge 
appear to be more lavishly endowed with it than others. 
Arithmetic is an area that provides many examples for the 
proponents of a priori knowledge. Individuals appear to 
exhibit abstract understanding about higher and lower levels 
of mathematics. If lower levels of arithmetic appear diffi­
cult to separate from the physical world consider examples 
in calculus. This area contains general and abstracted 
problems which are still believed to be universally true. 
Individual understanding of these problems may be independ­
ent of experience and considered totally a product of man's 
mind.
Another important area used for examples of a priori
knowledge is that of geometry. The following quotation
provides such an example from geometry.
The drawn triangle may provide the occasion for 
perceiving but it can not itself be the justifi­
cation of the fact that the sum of the angles
of all triangles is the same in plane geometry.*-® 
Consumer behavior and executive action are of special 
interest to the marketing scientist. Both of these areas 
may be grouped under the heading of human action. While 
views are not consistent on the extent of a priori know­
ledge in this area, some individuals believe that it is the 
only acceptable form. "The science of human action that 
strives for universally valid knowledge is the theoretical 
system. . . .  In all of its branches, this science is a 
priori, not empirical."*-1 Executive action and consumer be­
havior are also partly determined by the individual's sense 
of values. Even though an individual may never experience 
a given situation, he often injects in with his sense of 
values, . .in the cognition of things, its (a priori 
knowledge) role is different from that which it serves in 
connection with spiritual objects? the cognition of values 
rests on an a priori knowledge. . . #"12
All A Priori Knowledge is Synthetic or Analytic: 
Immanuel Kant popularized two types of a priori knowledge.1-*
lOjames Gutmann (editor), Philosophy A to Z, New York 
Grosset & Dunlap, 1963, p. 112.
^Ludwig von Mises, Epistemological Problems of Econo­
mics, New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1960, p. 12.
12Gutmann, op. cit., p. 112.
13Kant, o|>. cit., 655 pp.
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Kant called the two types analytic and synthetic. Briefly, 
analytic a priori knowledge is true in and of itself and 
adds nothing to man's store of knowledge. However, syn­
thetic a priori knowledge is known to be true through the 
action of man's mental faculties and does add to his store 
of knowledge. These two types are characteristics of a 
priori knowledge only.
Kant noticed, as did Locke before him, that in a cer­
tain type of a priori statement, the truth was determined 
merely by recognizing that nothing can both have and not 
have the same property at the same time. These kinds of 
statements are true in and of themselves. The following 
examples illustrate such statements. A cube has twelve 
equal sides. A retailer sells directly to consumers. 
Drop-shippers are marketing middlemen. Kant pointed out 
that the predicates of these kinds of statements are con­
tained in the s u b j e c t s . T h e  predicates are part or all 
of the definition of the subject. Kant names this type of 
proposition analytic. While Kant believed analytical state­
ments are "highly important and necessary," he also felt 
that they do not enlarge existing knowledge.
14Ibid., pp. 10-13,
15Ibid., p. 13.
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However, Kant did not believe that the analytical type 
was the only kind of a priori knowledge. Kant named the 
other kind of a priori knowledge synthetic. Synthetical a 
priori knowledge does not exhibit the subject-predicate 
connection that exists in the analytical form. Kant dif­
ferentiates the two types as follows:
Either the predicate B belongs to the subject B, 
as something which is contained in the conception 
A, (in a covert manner,) or B lies completely out 
of the conception A, although it stand in con­
nection with it. In the first case, I name the 
judgement analytical, in the other synthetical.
The synthetical a priori knowledge is the type that Kant
believed added to the store of knowledge.
In his Critik of Pure Reason, Kant states the belief 
that a priori synthetical judgements are contained as prin­
ciples in all theoretical sciences of . reason.-*-7 Mathematics, 
Natural Philosophy (Physics), and Metaphysics are cited and 
discussed as examples of areas where synthetical judgements 
occur. As a science of marketing can also be considered a 
theoretical science of reason, it may be expected to contain 
synthetical judgements.
How is it possible that synthetical a priori statements
16Ibid., p. 10
17Ibid., p. 13
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can be denied without self-contradiction, and yet, they are 
known a priori to be true? Basically, Kant's answer is 
that primary sense-data (color, hardness, etc.) is supplied
I
by the object with which the individual makes contact,
while the person supplies space and time arrangements. The
concepts of space and time are viewed as transcendentals
Kant's solution to this question was criticized both by
19proponents and critics of a priori knowledge. In spite 
of this criticism, Kant's split of a priori knowledge into 
analytic and synthetic is still widely used.
A Priori Knowledge is Characterized by Abstract Know­
ledge ; Human understanding may exist at two distinct levels. 
One level provides that knowledge which deals with objects 
and events as they exist in the physical world. This type 
of understanding is known as particular knowledge. The other 
level of understanding is abstracted from particular know­
ledge and deals with things which involve many particulars. 
This type of understanding is known as universal knowledge.
18Ibid., pp. 28-55.
■^9See Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap (editors) , A Modern 
Introduction to Philosophy, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free
Press, 1957, p. 11; Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Phil­
osophy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, pp. 87-
90; Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, London:
Victor Gollancz, 1950, pp. 82-87.
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Universal knowledge plays an important role in a priori 
knowledge.
Particular knowledge is that information about an in­
dividual event or object which is passed to the mind by the 
senses. Russell states that, "We speak of whatever is given 
in sensation, or is of the same nature as things given in 
sensation, as a particular. . . . n20 The important parts 
of this definition are, that only particular or individual 
events are involved, and that the data are collected by the 
senses. When a consumer looks at the price tag on a speci­
fic coat, she receives particular knowledge about the price 
of that coat. The world is a mass of particulars inter­
acting.
Universals are typically either relationships or 
generalized properties. Universals that are generalized 
properties include such things as whiteness, hardness, 
angularity, large, people, bears, etc. Broadly,-adjectives 
and substantives that are not proper names fit into this 
category. Universals that are relationships include pre­
positions and verbs such as equals, in, greater than, out­
side of, by, near, etc. Similarly, particulars can usually
20Russell, op. cit., p. 93; much of the discussion on 
universals and particulars is taken from this source, pp. 91- 
110.
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be given a proper name and at least, as in the case of 
pronouns, are represented by something that replaces a 
proper name. Even the ambiguous particulars, such as the 
word "now," represents some specific thing (e.g., 10:00 
A.M., Tuesday, January first).
Universals are abstractions of properties possessed 
by particulars. The process of abstraction is easy to 
visualize in the early development of a child. The first 
words spoken by a child usually represent particulars. It 
is easy to speculate that he first learns of particulars 
such as specific objects or people with which he comes in 
contact. Following the child's education still further, 
suppose he gradually makes contact with many more objects 
than before and several of these are similar in nature.
For example, besides the mother and father, he has come in 
contact with many other friends and relatives. All of these 
individuals are somewhat different, but all possess certain 
similarities. From these individual contacts, the first 
universals are understood. Instead of several different 
individuals, it becomes possible to develop by, first under­
standing particulars, and then abstracting to universals.
Besides being abstracted general properties, univer­
sals also occur as relationships. Consider the relationship
between two gas stations (station X and station Y) which 
operate across the street from each other. The statement, 
station X is near station Y represents a relationship be­
tween the particulars station X and station Y. The word 
that expresses the relationship is "near,” and as such, it 
is a universal.
A Priori Knowledge is a Relationship Between Universals 
Relationships exist between universals just as they do be­
tween particulars. For example, an individual easily per­
ceives the resemblance between shades of the same color. 
Light blue and dark blue are quite different from red and 
they are still classified under the same universal "blue."
To understand relationships between universals, a greater 
power of abstraction is required than the initial compre­
hension of universals from particulars. However, individu­
al abilities to understand these resemblances at higher 
levels of abstraction appear very effective.
According to some of the proponents of a priori know­
ledge, all instances of this source involve relationships
21between universals. Arithmetic provides the simplest ex­
ample. In the statement "two and two equals four," two.
21Ibid., p. 103.
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equals, and four are all universals. Also, the equation is 
claimed to illustrate a priori knowledge because individuals 
know that any and all combinations of two pairs equals four. 
This knowledge can exist without any contact between the 
individual and four objects. An individual is certain that 
two pebbles and two pebbles on Mars still equals four peb­
bles. This statement of a priori knowledge represents a 
relation between universals.
But while a priori knowledge occurs as relations be­
tween universals, empirical generalizations may also appear 
in this form.22 To determine the nature of a given proposi­
tion, the evidence upon which it rests must be considered.
If the evidence for the truth of the proposition is based on 
sense data, it is an empirical generalization. If the basis 
is intuitive, the proposition is based on a priori knowledge.
For an example of an empirical generalization based on 
universals, consider the statement, "All people who are 
alive have at least one of their five senses." People and 
senses are both universals. The information in this state­
ment is based on the observation of a large number of people, 
without finding one exception. Then, the statement is an
22Ibid., p. 107.
empirical generalization based on universals. Compare this 
example with the statement, "Two and two equals four,"
Again, the statement compares universals. But, as was ex­
plained in the prior discussion, an individual's knowledge 
that this statement will always be true is based on intui­
tive insight. Russell believes that the intuitive insight 
may occur: (1) after and because of an empirical generali­
zation, or (2) without a single contact with the particular.
Role in Theory Development
The recognition of a priori knowledge as one possible 
valid epistemology allows it to be used in scientific ex­
planation and theory development. If the entire explanation 
is based on synthetic a priori knowledge, the result may be 
called the "Synthetic A Priori Method of Scientific Explana­
tion." The synthetic a priori method is better known as the 
pure deductive method, but both names are u s e d . 34 The pure 
deductive method applies logic to basic synthetic a priori 
truths in order to deduce the desired explanation. There­
fore, only logic and synthetic a priori truths are necessary
23Ibid., p. 107.
A  «|
See the discussion in James H. Ryan, An Introduction 
to Philosophy, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924, pp.
18-19.
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to the pure deductive method. The process is identical to
the definition of scientific explanation in chapter I.
Ryan describes the method as follows: "(The pure deductive
method) proposes to deduce . . . from a central simple
truth, intuitively known, to a whole series of secondary
25truths, more complex than the original datum."
The purely deductive method is generally criticized
from two points of view. First, the existence of a priori
knowledge is questioned by some philosophers. Second, the
purely deductive method does not apply knowledge available
from empirical generalizations. Most of the philosophers
that are proponents of a priori knowledge do not exclude the
26possibility of a posteriori knowledge. The joint applica­
tion of the two sources of knowledge is a possible solution 
to the selection of an epistemology.
A POSTERIORI KNOWLEDGE
The aim of the discussion in this section is to analyze 
the nature and scope of a posteriori knowledge. Included in 
following discourse are the definition of a posteriori
25Ibid., p. 18.
26Notable exceptions have already been mentioned. Ration 
alism offers one example and Ludwig von Mises' episteraologi- 
cal proposal for economics is another.
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knowledge, an analysis of the basis for induction, and its 
role in theory development.
Definition
A posteriori knowledge is defined as that knowledge 
which comes directly from individual senses. The informa­
tion provided by the senses relates directly to the object 
of the perception and yields "particular" knowledge about 
that individual object. The word "particular" applies in 
the same sense that it did in the discussion of a priori 
knowledge. Concrete objects and events that are capable of 
stimulating the human senses are the only things which are 
potential a posteriori knowledge. Once these objects or 
events are perceived, they become a posteriori knowledge. 
Virtually no one denies the existence of basic a posteriori 
knowledge. As was mentioned earlier, even the proponents 
of a priori knowledge admit that all knowledge begins with 
experience. But individual particular knowledge is of limit­
ed value unless universals can be derived from it. For 
example, a significant amount of information may be known 
a posteriori about many middle class, middle income consumers. 
But unless this information can be turned into universal 
statements'about a "class" of consumers, it is not much help 
to the marketing scientist. The marketing scientist is
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limited to statements about the particular people for which 
information is available.
To obtain "universal" knowledge from particular a 
posteriori events requires the use of empirical generaliza­
tions. When many similar individual events are observed to 
have the same property, it is possible for a person to ab­
stract this property and generalize that it is common to all 
similar individual events. For example, an individual re­
calls that over his lifetime every bird known to be a crow 
which he observed was also black. When this individual is 
quizzed about the color of crows, he generalizes from his 
particular knowledge and answers that "All crows are black."
The main tool of the empiricist is a posteriori known 
fact. The job he performs is basically one of accumulating 
facts about a particular object in which he is interested. 
The following quotation illustrates the scope of the empiri­
cist’s task.
The experimental or analytic method is an adaption 
to the problems of philosophy of the methods used 
in the natural sciences. It consists in the obser­
vation, accumulation, and verification of facts.
All speculation or theorizing outside of or above 
observable fact is regarded as unscientific, and 
therefore incapable of producing truthful results.27
27James H. Ryan, An Introduction to Philosophy, New 
York: The MacMillan Company, 1924, pp. 16-17.
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The Basis for Empirical Generalizations
The process of obtaining empirical generalizations from 
a posteriori knowledge is commonly known as induction. The 
process involves a generalization from "particulars" to the 
whole universe of like objects or events. Moreover, the 
generalization is made for all time, not for just the 
present.28 From invariant sense-data about an object or 
event, an induction may be made about all similar objects or 
events, suitable for all time.
What makes induction possible? The answer is the
"uniformity of nature." Uniformity means that under similar
conditions events recur. John Stuart Mill describes the
situation as follows:
We must first observe that there is a principle
implied in the very statement of what Induction
is; an assumption with regard to the course of 
nature and the order of the parallel cases; . . .
This, I say, is an assumption involved in every 
case of induction.28
The Laws of Nature: Because uniformity of nature is
the basis for induction, some inductions seem to be more reli­
able than others. The generalizations that seem more
28John Hospers, An Introduction to philosophical Ana­
lysis, second edition, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Pren- 
tice-Hall, 1967, p. 250.
28John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, London: Longmans, 
Green,and Company, 1961, p. 200.
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reliable are based directly on the "laws of nature." The 
less reliable generalizations are less directly related to 
the laws of nature. The generalization that every tine a 
pencil is released above the floor (while on earth), it 
falls, is based on the law that two masses attract each 
other. The two masses are the earth and the pencil. This 
law yields the more common interpretation which is the law 
of gravity. The statement may be more acceptable than others. 
For example, consider this statement, "the sun will rise 
tomorrow." This statement is also based on the laws of 
nature, but it is more abstract relative to them. The 
possibility exists that a body from outside the solar sys­
tem may strike the earth and change its rotational pattern 
causing the sun not to rise tomorrow. This possibility is 
entirely within the framework of the laws of nature. Be­
cause the laws of nature may still be satisfied with induc­
tion becoming false, the more abstracted inductions may be 
considered less reliable.
A great deal more confidence is shown in the laws of 
nature than the occurrence of any particular event.30 Even 
in the specific case of the pencil falling, something may 
be found within the laws of nature that can offset the law
30Hospers, oj>. cit., p. 251.
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of gravity. Nevertheless, the law that two masses attract 
each other in a prescribed manner is not likely to be dis­
proved. The law operates so well that the existence of 
planets were predicted before they were visualized.
Universal Causation; While uniformity in nature yields 
a satisfactory, broad support for induction, belief in uni­
versal causation provides a more basic cornerstone for its 
acceptance. Universal causation carries with it the exis­
tence of uniformity in nature. The assumption that events 
have causes is common to even small children and higher order 
animals. The famous Pavlov experiments indicated that a 
dog could learn to connedt the ringing of a bell with the 
appearance of food. Similarly, chimpanzes have learned to 
connect cause and effect relationships in numerous psy­
chological experiments.
A usual definition of cause, and one that is used in
31this discourse, describes cause as a sufficient condition. 
This definition means that the occurrence of the cause is 
sufficient to make the effect unconditionally follow in 
sequence. However, a sufficient condition does not also 
need to be a necessary condition. When a cause is both
31Much of the following discussion is adapted from 
Hospers, Q£. cit., pp. 308-320.
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necessary and sufficient, knowledge of the effect also pro­
vides knowledge of the cause. When that occurs, the 
particular cause must always be present when the effect is 
present. The following example illustrates the existence 
of sufficient but not necessary cause.
A game warden observes a dead duck lying in a pond 
from a distance. The dead duck is viewed as the event, and 
the reason for its death is viewed as the cause. Of the 
many possible causes, the game warden recognizes two as be­
ing most probable. The two causes are (1) hunter, and (2) 
disease. Either of these causes is sufficient for the event, 
but neither cause is necessary. The hunter alone may have 
caused death. Similarly, disease alone may have caused 
death. The sufficient but not necessary condition exists 
whenever different independent causes are within themselves 
sufficient to produce the event.
A formal presentation of the law of universal causation 
may aid understanding its nature. One possible statement is 
that, "For every class of events E in the universe, there is 
a class of conditions C, such that whenever an instance of 
each member of class C occurs, an instance of E occurs."32
32Ibid., p. 308
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While class C may contain only one element, more often the 
class contains a multiple of items. An explanation of the 
occurrence of E is the goal of "scientific explanation."
The event E may be considered to be the explanandum. Then 
just as the explanan of the model may contain several items, 
so may C. The event E is not called an effect. Effect 
implies the automatic existence of cause, while event in­
cludes all occurrences. Event and cause are connected only 
through the law of universal causation.
Clarification is also needed on what is meant by "class 
of events" and "class of conditions" in the formal defini­
tion of universal causation. While an initial reaction may 
be to require each "class" to be identical, this solution is 
not entirely satisfactory. If each class is exactly iden­
tical, this solution is not entirely satisfactory. If each 
class is exactly identical, including conditions of time and 
space, only one particular event or cause is possible. The 
desirable conditions necessary to a particular class requires 
that events and causes be identical except for time and/or 
space. The conditions are met when either time or space or 
both are different and everything else is identical. The 
same example of hunter and the dead duck may be used to 
illustrate the differences. Let the class of conditions have 
only one type, called hunters. Similarly, let the class of
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events have only one type, called dead ducks. Then two 
hunters can each shoot a duck at the same time but in differ­
ent places (space). Another alternative is when the two 
hunters shoot a duck from the same blind (space) but at 
different times. In the third alternative, the two hunters 
shoot ducks at different times and in different places.
Extent of Human Belief in Cause: The nature of cause
in many events is extremely difficult to determine. If a 
person understands the branch of physics known as dynamics, 
he may feel certain that the path of a stone bouncing down 
a hill can be completely determined. A good chance exists 
that he also realizes the extreme difficulty in determining 
that path. Very detailed knowledge is required about each 
item with which the rock comes in contact. Also, similar 
detailed information is required about the rock itself and 
the initial conditions that started it rolling. Once the 
information is collected, a great deal of technical know­
ledge about physics is necessary to calculate the path of 
that stone.
In spite of the difficulty that often occurs in deter­
mining cause, human nature appears to be such that people do 
not doubt its existence. If a baffling occurrence does not 
appear to have a cause, knowledgeable people do not seem to 
question the relationship involved between the event and
universal causation. Rather, these people simply state that 
the cause was not found. As an example, medical researchers 
have been searching for a cause of cancer for several gener­
ations. Even after repeated set-backs, the researchers 
never question the law of universal causation. These re­
searchers were still firmly convinced that a cause existed. 
Apparently people are so convinced that universal causation 
exists, an observed difference between events seems to 
automatically imply a difference in cause. Hospers states, 
"We take the very fact of there being a difference in the 
E's as evidence that there was a difference in the C's.1,33
The firm belief in universal causation makes the law im­
possible to disprove. Individuals seem to accept every in­
stance which supports the law, but deny instances in which 
cause has not been found. These individuals do so by stating 
that the cause exists but just has not been found. This 
impossibility of disproof is important to understanding the 
nature of the law. Normal empirical generalizations can be 
disproved by the occurrence of one instance to the contrary. 
Consider the en£>irical generalization that "All crows are 
black." The discovery of one albino crow proves this state­
ment false. The possibility of disproof does not exist for
33Ibid., p. 313
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the law of universal causation.
Characteristics of A Posteriori Knowledge
A posteriori knowledge has certain characteristics that 
are peculiar to its nature. These characteristics become 
reasonably apparent once mentioned and do not need a great 
deal of elaboration.
First, a posteriori knowledge is characterized by the 
fact that it deals with concrete objects or events and does 
not involve a mental process except for perception. These 
objects or events exist even if they are not perceived by 
man, but they become knowledge when perception occurs. For 
example, a tree falls in a deserted area of a forest. No 
person senses the event. Therefore, the event is not a 
posteriori knowledge. If someone had been able in some way 
to perceive the tree falling, the event then becomes a 
posteriori knowledge.
Second, a posteriori knowledge is concerned only with 
the physical universe. Concrete objects or events which 
are capable of stimulating the human senses are necessarily 
also part of the physical universe. A priori knowledge is 
not so restricted. It may provide information about any 
esoteric topic however far removed from the physical universe. 
Third, a posteriori knowledge is dependent upon the
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human senses. Man's five senses are the communicators which 
relate the external facts to the mind. If it were possible 
for a man to exist without any of his senses, that man would 
be incapable of obtaining a posteriori knowledge. This 
situation does not exist for a priori knowledge if the man's 
mind is still capable of thought.
In the modern world, man's senses are capable of being 
highly tuned and amplified through the use of machines. The 
fact that the human eye is capable of perceiving a living 
cell through a microscope, does not change the primary nature 
of the information obtained. That information is still a 
posteriori. The microscope does, however, widen the universe 
of perceivable objects and events. Since the widening is 
possible, more potential a posteriori knowledge is available 
to man.
Role in Theory Development
In the process of scientific explanation when the 
source of knowledge is a posteriori, the scientist first 
collects the observed facts which represents the explanan, 
then applies logic to obtain the explanandum. If the ex- 
planans consists entirely of a posteriori knowledge, the 
process is known as pure induction. The explanandum is the 
explanation desired by the scientist. However, for the
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explanandum to be unquestionably true, the explanan must 
contain a posteriori knowledge which is unquestionably true. 
This situation is undesirable, and perhaps unattainable, to 
the scientist.
Theory development is a solution to the problem. If 
less than completely true information is used for the ex­
planan in the process of scientific explanation, the result- 
ing explanandum is defined as a theory. Larger numbers of 
known instances of a posteriori events causes greater ac­
ceptance of a theory than a smaller number. Since induction 
is a tool of the physical sciences, it has become highly
35developed. A branch of statistics is devoted to induction. 
Statistical induction is a process that allows the scientist 
to make statements of probability concerning the occurrence 
of an event.
Up to this point in the discussion, no unanswered argu­
ment against the existence of either a priori or a posteriori 
knowledge was presented. To state that arguments against 
both exist is a major understatement. The intent of the
34See the definition of scientific explanation and 
theory in Chapter I, pp. 8-10.
O C
Statistical induction is usually a major part of basic 
statistics texts. See for example parts 3 and 4 of Stephen 
P. Shao, Statistics for Business and Economics, Columbus, 
Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, 1967, pp. 247-486.
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discussion in the next chapter is to briefly examine those 
arguments that are most important.
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
Modern philosophers discuss two possible sources of 
knowledge. Those two sources are knowledge received a priori 
and a posteriori. The two sources may be used separately or 
combined in various degrees to establish a suitable episte- 
mology.
A priori knowledge is said to come from intuitive in­
sight which is best described as a transcendental state.
This form of knowledge is that which is self-evident and 
independent of particular empirical evidence. Mathematics 
and geometry are popular areas from which to provide examples 
of a priori knowledge.
In all cases, a priori knowledge is said to consist of 
relations between universals rather than particulars. Parti­
cular knowledge is defined to be the information directly 
obtained from sense-data of an individual object. Universal
i
knowledge is (1) information abstracted from a number of 
particulars having the same universal property, or (2) re­
lations between particulars. Examples of abstracted univer­
sals are whiteness, people, bears, large, etc. Examples of
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universals that are relations between particulars are in, 
around, between, near, etc.
Kant believed that priori knowledge existed in two 
states which he called analytic and synthetic. Analytic a 
priori knowledge occurs in propositions that are self­
contradictory if either the subject or predicate were re­
placed by its negative. An example, is nMy brother is my 
male sibling." To say that, "My brother is not my male 
sibling" is self-contradictory. Synthetic a priori know­
ledge is known to be true without the test of experience 
and is not analytic.
The application of only synthetic a priori knowledge to 
the explanan in the process of scientific explanation yields 
what is known as pure deductive reasoning. Pure deductive 
reasoning is then the result of selecting only a priori know­
ledge for an epistemology.
A posteriori knowledge may be equated with particular 
knowledge. This knowledge comes entirely from sense-data 
on a particular object. Facts, as experienced by man, are 
its total encompassment.
The application of only a posteriori knowledge to the 
explanan in scientific explanation yields what is commonly 
known as pure inductive reasoning. The epistemology of in­
ductive -reasoning is then totally made up of a posteriori
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knowledge.
The Intent of this chapter was to illustrate the two 
possible sources of knowledge, and by doing so, to provide 
the marketing scientist with a number of alternative episte- 
mologies. These potential epistemologies are the tools 
with which the marketing scientist may develop a better ap­
proach to marketing theory (primary hypothesis). Little or 
no comment was made of the attacks on each source of know­
ledge. The chapter leaves the impression that two accepted 
sources of knowledge do exist. The discourse in the follow­
ing chapter indicates that neither source is absolutely 
accpeted as a criterion of truth.
CHAPTER IV
PROBLEMS WITH THE TWO SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE
Strenuous philosophical debate has been directed toward 
the value and existence of both a priori and a posteriori 
knowledge. The defendants of each type of knowledge were 
less than totally successful in defending it. The result 
is to reduce the effectiveness of each. How do these prob­
lems relate to the hypotheses of the dissertation? Sub­
hypothesis three states that these problems adversely affect 
the marketing theorist's efforts at developing science in 
marketing. The primary intent of this chapter is to satisfy 
subhypothesis three. The relation between this subhypothesis 
and the primary hypothesis is that the former provides a 
constraint to the later. The primary hypothesis, and the 
other subhypotheses, discuss the improvement which study of 
epistemology can produce in marketing theory. The con­
straints indicate that the proper application of epistemology 
is not a panacea or cure-all, but its proper use may still 
provide considerable aid to the development of marketing 
theory.
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The existence and value of basic a priori knowledge is 
questioned, and the first major section of this chapter is 
used to examine these arguments. First, a discussion of 
the attempt to eliminate arithmetic as synthetic a priori 
knowledge is analyzed. Then, the attack on geometry is ex­
amined. Next, an analysis of arguments relating to other a 
priori propositions is presented. A rebuttal is then given 
to these arguments. Finally, conclusions on the effect of 
this debate are analyzed.
Basic a posteriori knowledge is usually accepted as a 
source of knowledge, but information induced from it has been 
severely criticized. A section of this chapter is devoted 
to an analysis of the problem. First, skepticism on unifor­
mity in nature is examined. Then the more basic problem of 
universal causation is discussed.
Another major section is used to present an overview of 
the problems presented in this chapter. That section is 
used to investigate useful conclusions for the marketing 
scientist. Other major sections are used to present a sum­
mary of analysis and an intermediate summary of conclusions.
THE LOGICAL POSITIVIST'S ARGUMENT 
ON A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE
Probably the most effective argument today against the
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existence of a priori knowledge was launched by logical 
positivism. These philosophers, known as logical positi­
vists, logical empiricists, or simply positivists may be 
identified by their beliefs concerning a priori and a 
posteriori knowledge. This group believes that the only 
source of knowledge that provides information about the 
physical universe is a posteriori. The logical positivists 
questioned the existence of any a priori knowledge that was 
not analytic in nature. Since the positivists' arguments 
appear to reduce the effectiveness of a priori knowledge, 
this section of the chapter is used to analyze their com­
plaints. This group attacked each type of example that was 
supposed to represent synthetic a priori knowledge. With 
each classification of synthetic a priori knowledge, the 
positivists attempted to prove that either the classifica­
tion was not a priori, or that it was analytic a priori.
The attack was different for many of the classifications, 
but the positivists appeared satisfied that they have elimi­
nated synthetic a priori knowledge.
The basic view of the logical positivist is that all 
propositions that can be known a priori are necessarily 
tautological. By tautology, the logical positivists mean 
essentially what Kant described as analytic propositions. 
Analytic statements can be proved true by merely referring
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to the law of noncontradiction. An analytic statement con­
tains both the object of the statement and something which 
is defined to be that object or at least part of that object. 
However, because something is a tautology does not neces­
sarily mean that it is highly simplified. The statement,
"A man is a person," is a tautology but so are statements 
requiring a great amount of reasoning to illustrate the 
equivalence. For example, an equation of calculus may be 
transformed, through complex manipulation, into an identity. 
In such a case, the equation is a tautology. Ayer states:
" . . .  an a priori truth is a tautology. And from a set 
of tautologies, taken by themselves, only further tautologies 
can be validly deduced." 1
Tautological Aspects of Arithmetic
Arithmetic statements such as: 7 + 5 = 12, were con­
sidered to be synthetic a priori by Kant and others.2 The 
logical positivists argue that arithmetic statements are, 
in fact, analytical or tautological. Bertrand Russell in
■'’Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, London: 
Victor Gollancz, 1950, p. 47. Ayer is accepted as a logical 
positivist, and his views are used extensively in this dis­
cussion.
2Kant's discussion on arithmetic occurs in Immanuel 
Kant, Critik of Pure Reason, London: William Pickering,
1838, pp. 13-15.
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Principia Mathematica reduces mathematics to its basic 
definitions and logic.3 This accomplishment makes the 
field of mathematics analytic by nature since only defini­
tions and tautologies remain. C. I. Lewis draws this same 
conclusion.
The truths of mathematics follow merely from 
definitions which exhibit the meaning of its 
concepts, by purely logical deduction. Judge­
ment of such mathematical truth is, thus, com­
pletely and exclusively analytic; no synthetic 
judgement, a priori or otherwise, is requisite 
to knowledge of pure mathematics.4
To understand what is meant by mathematics being analyti­
cal, consider the simple example of 7 + 5 = 12. What is 
meant by the numbers 12, 7, or 5? They mean the sum or 
group of 12, 7, and 5 objects, respectively. The number 12 
means 1+1+1+1 . . .  +1 twelve times. The equation may now be 
reduced to identical representations on each side of the 
equals sign. This statement is a tautology.
There are possible retorts to the logical positivist's 
view of arithmetic, but they are less than totally effective. 
For example, Kant pointed out that it was possible for him 
to think of 7 + 5 without thinking of 12, and that this
3Bertrand Russell, Principles of Mathematics, Waw York:
W. W. Norton, 1950, 534 pp. This book is a rewrite of 
Principia Mathematica.
^Clarence I. Lewis, Mind and the World-Order, New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929, p. 245.
ability clearly existed if larger numbers were considered.5 
Kant's conclusion was that arithmetic propositions such as 
7 + 5 = 12 are synthetic. The response of the logical 
positivist is that arithmetic propositions are in no way 
laws of psychology. An individual may find it possible to 
think of his brother without thinking that he is his male 
sibling. Nevertheless, the two are connected in a tauto­
logical sense. Large numbers do not change the connection 
because no one need immediately observe that connection for 
a tautology to exist.
Unreality of Euclid's Geometry
Geometry provides an interesting problem for the logi­
cal positivists and one of their most difficult to satisfy. 
Kant believed that geometry (the only type known in his day 
was Euclidean) is a study of the physical properties of 
space. If this premise is accepted, then geometry provides 
numerous synthetic a priori examples. Kant pointed out:
That the straight line between two points is the 
shortest, is a synthetical proposition. For my 
conception of straight contains nothing of quan­
tity, but only a quality. The conception of 
shortness is therefore wholly added, and cannot 
be deduced by any analysis from the conception 
of a straight line.6
5Kant, Oja. cit., p. 14.
6Kant, op. cit., p. 15.
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This proposition can not be attacked from the point of view 
that the definition of a straight line is the shortest dis­
tance between two points because that is not the case. The 
concept of a straight line does not necessarily include the 
shortest distance between two points. The a priorist may 
conclude that the statement is not tautological and must 
then be synthetic.
The logical positivists ask the question, "What, then, 
is the definition of straight?"7 straightness is a quality 
which people seem to understand but can not define. Straight­
ness fits nothing in the physical world exactly. This lack 
of connection with the physical world is the grounds upon 
which the logical positivists attack the a priori nature of 
Euclidean geometry.
Since the time of Kant's Critik other "applied" geo­
metries have been developed. These geometries are applied 
in the sense that they fit the physical world. On the basis 
of these geometries, the logical positivists refute the a 
priori nature of Euclidean geometry. Ayer states:
But while the view that pure geometry is con­
cerned wi;th physical space was plausible enough
1 " J' 11 1 M M  II I. I
^John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analy­
sis, second edition, Englewood Cliffs, Hew Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, 1967, p. 197.
in Kant's day, when the geometry of Euclid was the 
only geometry known, the subsequent invention of 
non-Euclidean geometries has shown it to be mis­
taken. We see now that the axioms of a geometry 
are simply the logical consequences of these 
definitions.8
According to the logical positivists, a geometry which is
not about physical space is not "about" anything.
If the above analysis is correct, how can Euclidean
geometry be so useful? The concepts of Euclid's geometry
are for the most part perfected abstractions of non-perfect
properties which exist in physical space. An individual
may easily think of several things, that exist in physical
*
space, which approach the concept of straightness. The 
path of a ray of light, the corner of a building, the edge 
of a book, etc., are all examples of things that approach 
the concept of straightness. Because of these kinds of 
similarities, Euclid's geometry can be applied to physical 
space and is useful.
Arguments on other A Priori Propositions
Another problem faced by the positivists occurs because 
of their interpretation of "analytic." Such phrases as, 
"Whatever is colored must be extended," and "Whatever has
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shape has size, are claimed by some rationalists to be
q
synthetic a priori in nature. The logical positivists 
argue that the propositions are analytical. They accept 
the fact that the statements are universally true, but state 
that the rules of language make them so, not intuitive in­
sight. Ayer refers to the proposition that "Nothing can 
be colored in different ways at the same time with respect 
to the same part of itself," which rationalists call an a 
priori judgement-.*0 About this proposition Ayer states:
I am not saying anything about the properties of 
any actual thing; but I am not talking nonsense.
I am expressing an analytic proposition, which 
records our determination to call a color expanse 
which differs in quality from a neighboring color 
expanse a different part of a given thing. In 
other words, I am simply calling attention to the 
implications of a certain linguistic usage.H
The difference between the rationalists and logical
positivists exists in different definitions of "analytic."
Apparently, two definitions are used by the logical posi-
12tivists. One of the two definitions of analytic applies
^These propositions and much of the rationalist view 
are taken from Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, New 
York: The MacMillan Company, 1940, Volume Two, pp. 399-427.
10Ibid., pp, 408-409.
**Ayer, op. cit., p. 79.
*2Hospers, op. cit., p. 201.
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to any proposition the negation of which is self-contra­
dictory. This definition does not apply to the priori pro­
positions in this section. For example, in the statement, 
"Whatever is colored must be extended," the key words 
"colored" and "extended" do not mean the same thing. The 
other definition applies to propositions where the rules of 
language make the statement analytic as indicated in the 
previous quotation by Ayer. This second sense of analytic 
reduces to the positivists' belief that "a proposition is 
analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions 
of the symbols it c o n t a i n s . T h e  fact that a second de­
finition is required to handle these propositions seems to 
take away from the positivists' arguments. The argument on 
the rules of language appears to be more of a quibble than 
a sophisticated argument.^
A Rationalist Rebuttal to the Arguments
A key word in the logic of statements in this section 
is "implies.” Each statement may be restructured into the 
form A implies B. For example, "Whatever is colored must be
^Ayer, op. cit., p. 78.
^Note the discussion on the subject by Blanshard, op. 
cit., p. 410.
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extended" becomes "A is colored implies A is extended."
The prior statement of Mr. Ayer indicates that implication 
may be defined in a number of ways, and the fact that one 
way is more common than others does not effect its validity 
as logic.15 But various definitions of implications do not 
serve the purpose of thought which is understanding. 
Blanshard believes that "implication" is defined in the 
logic of the positivists such that it has no- trace of neces­
sity. For this reason, he rejects their logic,
Blanshard believes that he can justify rejecting the 
logic of the positivists. Logic has been made into an 
"idle game" by the positivists. Originally the discipline 
of logic connected thought with an attempt to understand. 
Blanshard believes that the positivists have severed this
i .
connection and were wrong in doing so. In the following
quote Blanshard states:
This immanent end of thought (understanding) is 
really a bar to which all logics must submit 
themselves, and if a system presents itself in 
which the implicatory relation is defined as some 
random combination of truth values, it says,
"Does this satisfy the demand of thought for a 
connection that is intelligible and necessary?
If not, out it g o e s . " 316
15Ibid., pp. 409.-4111 the argument opposing the view 
of the logical positivists is taken entirely from Blanshard 
but is intended to be representative of the rationalist view.
15Ibid., p. 413.
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The limited freedom that exists in linguistics to choose 
various word conventions does not apply in logic, according 
to Blanshard.
An inconsistency also seems to exist in the positivist's 
doctrine of conventions. The positivist holds that logical 
laws are conventions and are arbitrary. However, the 
positivist's own practice of philosophy strictly follows 
one kind of logic over all others. No justification is 
given for this procedure. Blanshard accuses the positivists 
of, first, stating that all necessary conditions are mere 
conventions, then, selecting one necessary condition (a 
logic) and allowing no alternatives.
The debate is still going on between the rationalists 
and positivists and is stimulating significant controversy. 
Blanshard*s views are chosen to represent the rationalists' 
attack on the logical positivists because they were felt 
to be representative. Other views exist. The unsettled 
nature of the debate leaves a question on the existence of 
synthetic a priori knowledge.
Conclusions about the Arguments
The end result of the debate over the existence and im­
portance of a priori knowledge is uncertainty. This result 
is not highly satisfying for the marketing scientist. A
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decision to accept synthetic a priori knowledge as a valid 
source may require some hedging by the marketing scientist 
is order to satisfy his peers. One method of hedging is 
to require that all synthetic a priori knowledge be validat­
ed by empiricism. ' This approach has gained considerable 
backing. The following quotation is the second and third 
steps of which Keynes defines as the deductive method.
Next comes the purely deductive stage, in which 
are inferred the consequences that will ensue from 
the operation of the forces under given conditions. 
Lastly, by a comparison of what has been inferred 
with what can be directly observed to occur, an 
opportunity is afforded for testing the correct­
ness and practical adequacy of the two preceeding 
steps, . .
This attempt at hedging also has its problems. The 
problem of major significance lies in the supporting step 
of the process. Induction is required to give support to 
the synthetic a priori truths, but induction is also sur­
rounded by uncertainty.
THE PROBLEM WITH INDUCTION
The process of induction draws generalizations directly 
from a posteriori knowledge, but the basis for this process
17John Neville Keynes, The Scope and Method of Political 
Economy, fourth edition, New York: Kelley and Millman, 1955,
p. 217.
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is not totally accepted. In Chapter III# the basis for in­
duction was determined to be uniformity in nature and 
universal causation. The attack on induction questions 
whether these two foundations of the process are sound.
If uniformity in nature and the law of universal causa­
tion are found not to be true, induction is rendered impo­
tent. While the truth of a posteriori knowledge is not 
effected# the collection of individual facts derived from 
particular sense-data becomes almost useless. If cause does 
not exist, generalizations can not be induced from these 
facts.
Skepticism on Uniformity in Nature
David Hume provided the initial impetus for skepticism
18on the existence, of universal causation. Hume points out 
that empirical generalizations have the built-in presupposi­
tion that there is uniformity in nature# and that# unless 
support can be given to that presupposition, induction is 
impotent. Further# the question is raised as to what gives 
a person the right to make this assumption. What gives an 
individual the right to say that the evidence of the past is
18David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding# 
New York: The Liberal Arts Press# 1955# 198 pp.
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relevant to anything in the future?
. . . all our experimental conclusions proceed 
upon the supposition that the future will be 
conformable to the past.
On what process of argument is inference founded? 
Where is the medium, the interposing ideas which 
join propositions so very wide of each other?
If there be any suspicion that the course of 
nature may change and that the past may be no 
rule for the future, all experience becomes use­
less and can give rise to no inference or con­
clusion.^9
Is it possible to know that the future will be like the 
past? Precisely as stated, the answer is probably not. The 
only truly satisfactory evidence, if the evidence was pos­
sible, is to look into the future and compare what is seen 
with what is projected. The feat is impossible, but the 
impossibility does not ruin the usefulness of induction.
If the process of induction is based on the projected
uniformity of nature, how can induction be considered a
logically sound method? The question has numerous attempted
50answers in the literature of philosophy. One of these
19Ibid., pp. 49-51.
20Hospers, op. cit., pp. 256-259.
answers is a pragmatic justification. A pragmatic answer 
may admit the inability to offer satisfactory proof on the 
existence of projected uniformity in nature. However, the 
pragmatist can point to the past and indicate that whenever 
he predicted the dropping of a pencil, it did drop when the 
future of that prediction occurred. Historical evidence 
exists in large quantities to support the proposition. The 
pragmatist can say that, because of the historical evidence, 
he intends to act as if projected uniformity in nature is a 
fact. If a person acts as if projected uniformity is a 
fact and the future proves this belief to be untrue, all 
his efforts are wasted. However, the pragmatist may argue 
that such wasted effort is no worse than inaction. Those 
people who are afraid to use the inductive process, because 
they do not know that the future is like the past, are forced 
into that inaction. Further, the pragmatist may argue, 
much can be learned if the future is like the past.
The pragmatist's answer to the problems is a possible 
approach, but that approach is not a solution to the problem. 
The problem still exists even if individuals choose to ignore 
it. Moreover, this approach flies in the face of everything 
that is scientific. Is not a science an effort at solving 
problems? To ignore a problem that lies at the very base of
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an important tool used by scientists is not a very satis­
factory answer. The only reasonable application of this 
approach seems to be when no other satisfactory approach 
exists.
The More Basic Problem of Universal Causation
The belief in universal causation is a somewhat more 
basic problem. How can an individual know that every event 
has a cause? The discussion in Chapter III on universal 
causation indicates that apparently people do believe that 
it exists. Individuals seem to have knowledge about the 
existence of cause that goes beyond the belief in uniformity 
of nature. Yet, the establishment of universal causation 
carries with it the existence of uniformity in nature.
Can the law of universal causation be proved by offer­
ing the numerous examples of cause and effect as evidence 
in its behalf? The answer is no. The reason for the answer 
lies in what is behind such an attempted proof. The basis 
for the proof is induction. Yet universal causation must be 
true for induction to be valid. Thus circular reasoning is 
involved. Such a proof begs the question because the law is 
the basis for all induction. Therefore, the many instances 
which can be pointed to as examples are not suitable as a 
basis for establishing the truth of the law.
What then is the basis for human belxef in the law of 
universal causation? None of the answers to this question 
seem totally satisfying. Hume attempted to solve the prob­
lem which he had helped to create in a way that still re­
tains some of its validity. In all empirical generalizations
or inductions, a step is taken by the mind which is "not
21supported by any argument or process of understanding."
This step implies universal causation, and yet the mind makes 
little hesitation in taking it. Apparently some principle 
other than reasoning allows him to draw his conclusions.
Hume states that, "This principle is custom or habit.1,22 If 
Hume's explanation is true, then all empirical generaliza­
tions are the end products of habit, not of reasoning. This 
solution is not very satisfying to empiricists, but it has 
retained a degree of acceptance.
The Indirect Approach: John Stuart Mill is a well 
known ultra-empiricist who believes that an indirect method 
of empirical generalization is the proper approach.23 This
21Ibid., p. 55.
22Ibid., p. 56.
23Mill's major work in this area is a support of pure 
induction and is found in John Stuart Mill, A System of 
Logic, London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1961, 622 pp.
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approach is suitable for use because the antecedent part 
of the cause-effect relationship must be s sufficient con­
dition. Mill states: "Invariable sequence, therefore, is
not synonymous with causation, unless the sequence, besides 
being invariable, is unconditional.1,24 If Mill's definition 
is accepted, then no exceptions to cause-effect relationships 
are allowable.
Mill realized that circular reasoning occurs when the 
proof of the law of universal causation is attempted by the 
indirect method. Also, the impossibility of disproving the 
existence of universal causation was discussed and illustra­
ted in Chapter III. The indirect approach is not satisfac­
tory in proving the existence of universal causation. But 
Mill argued that in this instance a direct inductive approach 
was possible.25 If a large diversified sample exists, 
direct introduction is reliable according to Mill. The law 
of universal causation fits this description.
Mill apparently overlooked an important fact in his 
analysis that tends to make it impotent against Hume's 
argument. This fact is that the very instances that must 
be used, in a direct inductive approach, to satisfy the law
24Ibid., p. 222.
25Ibid., pp. 206-221
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of universal causation are themselves causal laws. These 
supporting causal laws can not be proven by direct induc­
tion according to Mill's own theory. Since these laws can 
not be proven by direct induction, and since they are 
directly dependent on the law of universal causation, they 
are not suitable as proof of universal causation. Thus 
Mill's argument is not a satisfactory solution to the prob­
lem of causation.
Source of Knowledge on Cause: Hume suggested that human
belief in universal causation was nothing more than habit.
The idea that the law is a habit, suggestion, or hope has 
some merit. The primary objection that may be offered to 
this explanation is the degree of the law's acceptance.
Hope and habit can generally, be changed through experience 
with negative events. The belief in universal causation 
appears to be stronger than mere hope. While this objec­
tion does not negate the explanation, it does raise an 
important question.
Another possible explanation of an individual's know­
ledge about universal causation is that this knowledge is 
synthetic a priori in nature. This explanation agrees 
favorably with the observed high degree of acceptance 
previously mentioned. The possibility is not a happy one
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for the ultra-empiricist who does not believe in a priori 
knowledge. The truth of this possibility means that all 
induction is based on a law known a priori.
Other possibilities exist, but the inability to de­
finitely explain universal causation is a severe blow to 
the process of induction. The fact that empiricists can 
not be sure of the basis for all their inductions, leaves 
it in much the same state of uncertainty that exists with 
a priori knowledge. Therefore, the inductive process is 
not capable of eliminating the uncertainty surrounding 
synthetic a priori knowledge. This state of uncertainty 
is what marketing scientists must face when searching for 
a source of knowledge upon which to base their theories.
The effect of this uncertainty on the marketing scientist 
is the topic of the following section.
CONCLUSIONS FOR THE MARKETING SCIENTIST
After reviewing all of the arguments against the various 
forms of knowledge, what conclusions may be made by the 
marketing scientist? The primary conclusion must be, that 
the best which may be expected is uncertainty. This con­
clusion is in total agreement with subhypothesis three which 
states, "That unsettled differences among authorities on 
epistemology adversely effect the ability of marketing
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theorists to develop the field into a science." Like a 
great many things related to man and his universe, uncer­
tainty is the best an individual may expect to know. While 
uncertainty is nothing new to the marketing man, the purpose 
of working toward the development of science in marketing 
is to significantly reduce uncertainty, of what value is 
the study of epistemology to the marketing scientist if un­
certainty is its end result?
Knowledge of epistemology provides the marketing sci­
entist with a valuable weapon against uncertainty in spite 
of the fact that uncertainty is a part of both sources of 
knowledge. Uncertainty occurs in degrees, normally referred 
to as probability of occurrence. Greater assurance provided 
an individual about the truth of an explanation or pre­
diction proportionally reduce uncertainty. The physical 
sciences have used scientific methodology to reduce uncer­
tainty until it is almost eliminated. Within the physical 
sciences, the primary element of uncertainty which remains 
is that which is related to epistemology.
The following illustration may aid understanding. To 
some degree, people can not be sure that universal causation 
exists. Still, if we assume the existence of universal
^Chapter I, p. 3
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causation, and then predict a pencil will fall to the floor 
when dropped because a law of nature causes it to do so, 
the prediction is highly probable. Note that the prediction 
is not certain, but it is highly probable. Would not a 
marketing scientist be exceedingly happy knowing that one 
of his explanations about channel systems is only as prob­
able as the prediction of a pencil falling when dropped?
The answer is obvious and a tremendous amount of advancement 
must be achieved before the level of assurance is possible 
in a science of marketing. A knowledge of epistemology can 
aid in making advances. The basic process of epistemologi- 
cal assistance to the development of science in marketing 
was examined in Chapter IX.
But do these uncertainties force the marketing scientist 
into accepting the role of a pragmatist? The answer is 
"not necessarily." The marketing theorist may play a major 
role in the search for the nature and criterion of truth. 
Since the job of a scientist is the reduction of uncertainty 
and since the uncertainty of epistemology is part of all 
sciences, then the job of a marketing theorist logically 
includes the epistemological problems. However, the fact 
that the marketing scientist may face the epistemological 
problems does not mean that he can not use epistemology to
112
aid him in solving other problems.
When a marketing scientist devises a theory, he has 
automatically selected an epistemology. That epistemology 
may not be consciously known, or it may be completely mis­
understood. Epistemological errors can easily occur under 
this type of situation. A thorough knowledge of the area 
by marketing scientists may prevent, or at least reduce, 
these errors. Elimination of the errors increases the prob­
ability of successful explanation of the theory. Knowledge 
of epistemology and its uncertainties by the marketing 
scientist allows him to make the best usage of this tool.
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
The purpose of this chapter was to present some of the 
arguments opposing the two sources of knowledge. The effec­
tiveness of both a priori and a posteriori knowledge were 
reduced by these attacks.
Logical positivism contains one of the most strenuous 
and most effective attacks on a priori knowledge. The major 
premise of the attack is that synthetic a priori knowledge 
does not exist. Only analytic a priori knowledge is admitted. 
But, analytic a priori knowledge is not a meaningful source 
upon which the marketing scientist can base theory. The 
positivist's attack is aimed at each individual supposed
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source of synthetic a priori knowledge. An attempt is made 
to show that arithmetic is tautological or analytic. The 
propositions of Euclid's geometry are not allowed as syn­
thetic a priori knowledge on the grounds that the proposi­
tions do not represent anything in the physical world.
Other supposed synthetic a priori known statements are also 
eliminated by the positivists. This last group is said to 
be analytic because of the way language is used. The last 
attack by the positivists requires a modification of the 
definition of analytic. Rationalists do not accept the 
verdict of the logical positivists on a priori knowledge.
The result of the debate seems uncertain.
The existence of a posteriori knowledge is generally 
not questioned, but more important, the use that can be made 
of it is doubted. The problem exists in the nature of 
causation. The whole process of scientific explanation is 
based on a search for cause or explanation. The belief in 
universal causation is apparently deeply embedded in 
knowledgeable human understanding, in fact, knowledge is 
often equated with the understanding of many causal rela­
tionships .
But Hume asked about the nature of cause, "Where does 
knowledge of causation come from?1 The belief in universal
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causation is at the base of empirical generalizations. 
Therefore, an attempt to use induction to prove the exist­
ence of universal causation results in circular reasoning. 
Moreover, a close analysis of the nature of universal causa­
tion indicates the inability to disprove the proposition. 
Hume's own answer to the problem is that individual belief 
in universal causation is nothing more than habit. This 
answer retains some credence but does not reasonably explain 
the intenseness of the belief. Another solution is that the 
individual knowledge is synthetic a priori. Still other 
possibilities have been suggested. The end result is con­
siderable uncertainty.
The intent of this chapter was to illustrate some of 
the problems a marketing scientist is going to have in 
selecting his source(s) of knowledge. A sound epistemology 
is important in developing theory. The initial, and perhaps 
most difficult step, in the development of marketing theory 
is selection of a sound epistemology.
INTERMEDIATE SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
This point in the dissertation marks the division be­
tween theoretical analysis and empirical analysis. For 
that reason, this summary of conclusions is provided. The
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theoretical analysis in the prior chapters was developed to 
illustrate what part epistemology plays in the developing 
marketing theory. The accomplishment of this feat required 
three chapters.
Chapter II was used to establish the basic role and 
value of epistemology to marketing theory. Value was deter­
mined to be a function of (1) the efficiency of epistemology 
in aiding the development of science in marketing, and (2) 
the desirability of making marketing a science.
Efficiency may be interpreted to mean how well episte­
mology can accomplish its task. Apparently epistemology and 
methodology in general are not cure-alls, but they can be a 
great deal of help. However, the development of science in 
marketing is faced with several problems in addition to those 
normally dealt with in the physical sciences. These addi­
tional problems make the methodology more complex but do not 
seem to destroy the possibility of science in marketing.
The desirability of developing science in marketing also 
aids in determining the role and value of epistemology. The 
increase of knowledge in marketing,..necessary to the develop­
ment of science, may require the reduction of consumer 
privacy. The cost of the effort may be more than people are 
willing to pay. But in spite of this cost, marketing men 
have embarked upon the path to science.
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Chapter III was used to investigate what sources of 
knowledge were available to marketing scientists in order 
that they may develop a sound epistemology. The two pos­
sible sources were discovered to be a priori and a 
posteriori. A priori knowledge is that self-evident know­
ledge which is independent of experience. This kind of 
knowledge always deals with the connection of universals 
according to one group of philosophers. The source of a 
priori knowledge is deemed transcendental, and it is com­
monly known as intuitive insight.
A posteriori knowledge is a product of individual sense- 
data. An individual knows what his senses communicate to 
him. However, specific facts about particulars are not 
nearly so important as the generalizations derived from 
them. The process of empirical generalization is commonly 
known as induction. The source of justification in making 
empirical generalizations comes from the uniformity which 
exists in nature.
Chapter IV was used to analyze certain arguments which 
tended to make two sources of knowledge less effective. The 
logical positivists questioned the existence of synthetic a 
priori knowledge. These positivists believed that only 
analytic a priori and empirical knowledge exists. While 
these people attempted to disprove the various instances of
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supposed a priori knowledge# some question remains as to 
whether they were successful.
The major point of contention with a posteriori know­
ledge and induction occurs in the question of universal 
causation. The law of universal causation is the basis for 
induction. Hume believes that individual acceptance of the 
law is nothing more than habit. The law apparently can not 
be justified through induction. Uncertainty in this area 
limits the effectiveness of induction .as a source of know­
ledge .
Absolute certainty about a useful source of knowledge 
does not seem to exist. Since certainty is a requirement 
in the explanan of an effort at scientific explanation# the 
definition is meaningful only as a way of understanding the 
idealized process. However, the requirements of "theory" 
are not so restrictive. The distinction between the two was 
made to illustrate the importance of establishing the 
soundest possible epistemology in the development of 
marketing theory.
For epistemology to play its part in theory development# 
the individuals in marketing# most likely to develop theory# 
must be aware of its role. The chapters which follow are 
the results of an attempt to discover the awareness of 
marketing scholars. This attempt was an empirical investi­
gation made among marketing professors that were members of
the American Marketing Association.
CHAPTER V
A HISTORICAL SKETCH OP RESPONDENTS
The purpose of this chapter is to provide insight into 
the nature of the people that responded to the mail survey. 
This intent is accomplished by analyzing the historical 
information provided in the questionnaire. Tabular presen­
tations and analysis are also made of certain cross-classi­
fied historical data.
This chapter is important in establishing the closeness 
of the respondents to an ideal population. The ideal popula­
tion was described in Chapter I as containing "all of those 
persons that shall be formulating or teaching marketing 
theory sometime in the near future."1 This population is 
selected as the ideal because it is the one that epistemology 
can most benefit. The first subhypothesis states that "one 
criteria for judging a better approach to develop marketing 
theories is the degree to which marketing theorists understand 
the problems of epistemology. The ideal population
^■Chapter I. p. 15. 
^Chapter I. p. 3 .
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represents what is meant by "marketing theorist" in this 
subhypothesis. However, the impossibility of knowing who 
fits into the ideal population presents a problem. This 
problem was solved by substituting the academic members of 
the American Marketing Association for the ideal.^ This 
chapter is used to examine the degree of substitutability 
between the two groups. However, such an analysis can only 
be speculative since the members of the ideal group cannot 
be known.
A historical sketch of the respondents is also impor­
tant in analyzing the answers given. The background of the 
respondents may reasonably be expected to affect their re­
action to the questions. Thus, the sketch presented in this 
chapter is the groundwork necessary for the analysis of other 
questions.
RELATION TO EMPLOYING INSTITUTION
A minimum amount of information was requested about the 
employing institution of the respondents. An effort was 
maintained to keep the returns as anonymous as possible.
This attempt at anonymity was promised in both the cover 
letter and the introduction to the questionnaire.4 A direct
^Note the discussion in Chapter I. pp. 15-21.
^Appendix A and B.
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request for the name of the employing institution was 
judged to be construed as a violation of that promise. The 
only information requested was whether the institution is 
public (state or municipal) or private. Out of 124 respon­
dents , one (0.8%) did not answer the question, 86 (69.4%) 
answered that they were employed by a public institution 
and 37 (29.8%) stated that they were employed by a private 
institution.5
All 124 respondents replied to the question which re­
quested their academic rank. The following table is a 
presentation of the results of the answers.
Table 5.1 
Academic Rank of Respondents
Academic Rank Number Percent
Instructor 1 0.8
Assistant Professor 22 17.8
Associate Professor 37 29.8
Professor 62 50.0
Other 2 1.6
Source: Appendix A
Several reasons may exist for the large percentage of 
full professors that were respondents. First, an individual
5Appendix A.
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may speculate that as a professor becomes academicly estab­
lished, he is more likely to be interested in organizations 
like the American Marketing Association (A.M.A.) . If a 
greater percentage of the full professors in marketing are 
members in A.M.A. than for other levels, they are more likely 
to appear as respondents. Second, a person may also specu­
late that full professors are somewhat more interested in 
helping graduate students than those who are still climbing 
the ladder. If this speculation is true, full professors 
are more likely to have answered the questionnaire than others. 
Third, the full professors may have been less cynical and 
less generally critical about this study.
The high proportion of full and associate professors 
indicates that the respondents are at least in positions 
where theory may be taught and developed. Theory courses 
in marketing often appear on the graduate level of univer­
sity curriculums. A high proportion of senior faculty mem­
bers seems to be favorable in estimating the ideal 
population.
ACADEMIC CONSIDERATIONS
The relationship between the institutions which confer­
red existing academic honors and the respondents was deemed 
important in establishing background factors of those people
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that returned the questionnaire. The background factors 
are presented in an effort to aid analysis of future ques­
tions and to establish a relationship with the ideal 
population.
Highest Level of Academic Achievement
The 124 respondents all answered the question pertain­
ing to level of achievement, and all of them indicated that 
they held at least a Master's degree. The following table 
is used to present the results.
Table 5.2 
Highest Academic Achievement
Level of Achievement Number Percent
Masters 10 8.1
All But Doctorate 16 12.9
Doctorate 97 78.2
Other 1 0.8
Source: Appendix A
Several reasons may be given as to why such a large 
percentage of respondents have their doctorate degrees.
Table 5.1 contains figures which indicate that 79.8% of the 
respondents had an academic rank of associate or full
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professor, and most of these people may be expected to have 
their doctorates. The same speculations that applied to the 
large number of full professors also may be used as reasons 
for the large percentage of respondents with doctorates.
The high percentage of doctorates appears to be desir­
able in light of the ideal population requirements. The 
doctorate degree requires a certain contact with research 
and with methodology that may not be present in the other 
levels of achievement.
Institution Conferring Level of Attainment
In group the various institutions into meaningful 
combinations, athletic conferences with some minor alterna­
tions were used. These combinations were chosen because 
theyaare reasonably well known, and because they appear to 
represent similar academic attitudes in addition to athle­
tics. The results of this grouping follow.
Table 5.3
Institution Conferring Highest 
Level of Attainment
Conferring Institutions Number Percent
No Response 3 2.4
Ivy League 20 16.1
Big Ten 44 35.6
Table 5.3 (Continued)
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Conferring Institutions Number Percent
Southeastern Conference^ 6 4.8
Southwestern Conference 7 5.6
Big Eight & Western Athletic 7 5.6
Pacific Coast 10 8.1
Southern 1 0.8
Major Independent^ 14 11.3
Other 12 9.7
Source: Appendix A
♦Includes Florida State University 
♦♦includes: Syracuse, University of Chicago, New
York University, M.I.T., and Penn State 
University.
The primary significance of the above table is that the 
large majority of the respondents were from reasonably large, 
major institutions. Also, over fifty percent attained their 
levels from ivy League or Big Ten schools. The few major 
independent universities contained the third largest number 
of respondents. The reasons for the nature of this distribu­
tion lie to a large extent, in the number of doctorates 
awarded by these institutions. For the twelve years of 
1947-1958 inclusive. Big Ten and Ivy League schools granted 
60.9% of the doctorates in business that were granted by U. 
S. universities.6 This figure compares favorably with the
Calculated from figures in: Robert A. Gordon and
James E. Howell, Higher Education for Business, New York:
51.7% of the respondents who received degrees from these 
schools. Also, during the same period, the major indepen­
dent universities graduated 20.3% of the doctorates in 
business, which again compares favorably with the 11.3% of 
respondents from these schools.7 Of the top thirteen uni­
versities in the number of doctorates granted, ten were Ivy 
League or Big Ten schools, while two of the other three were 
Major Independents.8 However, no conclusion can be drawn 
from these figures about how the results aid in building the 
background for analysis of other questions.
Major Area of Study
The respondents were quizzed about the major area of 
their studies in the above institutions. All of those people 
that returned the questionnaire answered the question. The 
results were broken into three groups and are presented in 
the following table.
Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 398.
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Table 5.4 
Major Area of Study
Major Area Number Percent
Marketing 63 50.9
Economics 38 30.6
Other 23 18.5
Source: Appendix A
PERSONAL DATA
Certain aspects of the personal background of respon­
dents was deemed as having possible value. At the least, 
this information provides some further insight into the nature 
of the respondents. The personal information includes age, 
years as full-time teacher, and two major areas of academic 
interest.
Age
The ageB of the respondents were grouped in sets of 
five years. No respondent was found to be twenty-five or 
less, and none was found to be greater than seventy-five 
years old.
Further calculations on age were performed. The mean 
age of all respondents, using individual ages rather than 
groupings, was found to be 45.6 years. The conclusion is
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that the age of the respondents was reasonably well dis­
persed (standard deviation = 10.0 years), and that the 
majority of the ages were between 35 and 55 years.
Table 5.5 
Age of Respondent
Inclusive 
Age Grouping
Number Percent
No Response 1 0.8
26 - 30 8 6.4
3 1 - 3 5 13 10.5
36 - 40 21 16.9
41 - 45 18 14.5
46 - 50 28 22.7
51 - 55 14 11.3
56 - 60 13 10.5
61 - 65 3 2.4
66 - 70 4 3.2
71 - 75 1 0.8
Source: Appendix A
Years as. Eul1-Time Teacher
The respondents were also requested to supply the num­
ber of years in which they had been employed as a full-time 
teacher. The answers were grouped in units of five years 
for tabular presentation. No respondent had been teaching 
for more than forty years.
Further calculations on individual, ungrouped responses 
indicated that the mean years taught was 14.0, and the
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standard deviation was 9.2 years. These figures indicate 
that a reasonably wide span of teaching experience existed 
(standard deviation « 9.2 years), and that the majority of 
the respondents had from five to twenty-three years full­
time teaching experience.
Table 5.6 
Years as Full-Time Teacher
Inclusive
Years Number Percent
No Response 4 3.2
1 - 5 31 25.1
6 - 1 0 23 18.6
11 - 15 18 14.5
21 - 25 19 15.3
26 - 30 3 2.4
31 - 35 1 0.8
36 - 40 5 4.0
Source: Appendix A .
Interest in Theory and Research
The respondents were requested to list two areas in 
marketing that interested them most. The answers received 
were grouped into theory, research, both theory and research, 
and other.
By the nature of the question, no judgment could be 
made on the interest in theory pertaining to the "other" areas. 
For example, the respondent may have answered "retailing" and
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"consumer behavior" to this question. In that case, the 
response is classified as "other." Nevertheless, the res­
pondent may have been keenly interested in both retailing 
theory and consumer behavior theory. Unless theory was 
specifically mentioned as one of the two marketing interests 
of the respondent, that classification was not used.
Table 5.7
Respondent Interest in Theory and Research
Area of Interest Number Percent
No Response 3 2.4
Theory 10 8.1
Research 38 30.6
Both Theory and Research 3 2.4
Other 70 56.5
Source: Appendix A .
Research was included as a separate classification be­
cause of the important role it plays in developing marketing 
theory. Any marketing researcher is a potential marketing 
theorist. The three categories that represent stated inter­
est in marketing theory or research contains 41.1% of the 
total respondents. The total group of respondents appear at 
least compatible with the ideal population.
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STUDY OP METHODOLOGY
Questions 11 and 111 of the questionnaire (Appendix A) 
quizzed the respondents on whether they had studied method­
ology formally or informally. Of considerable importance in 
the direct approach used for these questions is the fact 
that no definition was given to the term "methodology." The 
only attempt at definition was the use of the descriptive 
phrases "role of methodology in developing theory" and 
"philosophical viewpoints on methodology." The interpreta­
tion was largely left to the respondent. Undoubtably, this 
interpretation varied greatly among those that answered the 
questions. Still, the answers give some insight into 
whether the respondents view themselves as being versed in 
what they understand to be methodology.
Formal In-Depth Study of Methodology
This answer required a yes or no response. Thus, those 
persons that answered the question had to define both "in- 
depth" and "methodology" to their own satisfaction. Formal 
study was defined in the question as meaning that which oc­
curred in the classroom. All respondents answered the 
question.
Table 5.8
Formal In-Depth Study of Methodology
Response Number Percent
Yes
No
57
67
46.0
54.0
Source: Appendix A.
Informal Study of Methodology
To answer this question the respondent was required to 
define both philosophical viewpoints and methodology to his 
satisfaction. Again, a yes or no response was required. In­
formal study was defined in the question as meaning outside 
the classroom.
Table 5.9 
Informal Study of Methodology
Response Number Percent
Yes 94 75.8
No 30 24.2
Source: Appendix A.
An interesting insight into the type of respondent is 
that, the large majority of them claim some understanding of 
methodology. The source of this understanding may be formal
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or informal, but most of these people believe they possess 
a reasonable understanding of methodology.
STUDY OP METHODOLOGY COMPARED TO INTEREST
AND TRAINING
This section is used to investigate the type of people 
that claimed to have studied methodology either formally or 
informally. Those cross-classifications of study in method­
ology with other historical elements are used to aid under­
standing of the respondent's background. Other possible 
combinations are omitted.
In the following tables "formal1 is intended to mean 
formal in-depth study of the role of methodology in develop­
ing theory. Similarly, "informal" is intended to mean in­
formal study of the philosophical viewpoints on methodology. 
This tabular format is continued throughout the section in 
order to provide maximum readability.
Study in Methodology and Academic Rank
The following table is a presentation of the results 
of this cross-classification.
The sharp percentage decrease in formal methodological 
training when moving from assistant professor to full 
professor tends to indicate increasing interest in the sub­
ject as taught in universities. An interesting insight is
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gained into the respondents by considering that a large 
portion of those who had no formal training claim to have 
studied methodology informally. The following section adds 
support to the concept of increased academic interest in 
methodology.
Table 5.10
Study in Methodology and Academic Hank
Rank Formal Informal
Yes Mo Yes No
Num- Per- Num­ Per­ Num­ Per­ Num­ Per­
ber cent ber cent ber cent ber cent
Assistant
Professor 14 63.6 8 36.4 15 68.2 7 31.8
Associate
Professor 18 48.6 19 51.4 29 78.4 8 21.6
Pull
Professor 22 35.5 40 64.5 47 75.8 15 24.2
Source: Appendix A .
Study in Methodology and Teaching Experience
This tabular presentation, is used to support the prior 
one in the speculation that academic interest in methodology 
has steadily increased.
If the years as a full-time teacher may be used to ap­
proximate roughly the years after degree, the table illustrates 
that more recent graduates were exposed to formal study in
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methodology than earlier graduates. These results concur 
with the results of the prior section on academic rank. The 
inference may also be through all categories of full-time 
teaching years, the majority of respondents consider them­
selves to have informally studied the concepts of methodology.
Table 5.11
Study in Methodology and Years as 
Full-Time Teacher
Years as Formal Informal
Full-Time Yes No Yes No
Teacher Num- Per- Num­- Per­ Num- Per- Num- Per-
ber cent ber cent ber cent ber cent
1 - 5 20 64.5 11 35.5 22 71.0 9 29.0
6 -10 12 52.2 11 47.8 20 87.0 3 13.0
11-15 10 55.6 8 44.4 15 83.3 3 16.7
16-20 5 25.0 15 75.0 13 65.0 7 35.0
21-25 5 26.3 14 73.7 17 89.5 2 10.5
26-30 1 33.3 2 66.7 2 66.7 1 33.3
31-35 1 100.0 0 0.0 1 100.0 0 0.0
36-40 1 20.0 4 80.0 3 60.0 2 40.0
Source: Appendix A.
Study in Methodology and Major Area of Study
This section provides the basis for comparison between 
marketing, economics, and the other areas on the respondents 
belief that they have studied methodology.
Little difference is apparent between the three cate­
gories listed in Table 5.12. All three categories are within
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about ten percentage points of each other. However, when 
analyzing the apparent similarities between areas, the con­
cept being measured must be kept in mind. The extent to 
which respondents believe they have studied methodology is 
what has been measured. This analysis illustrates the 
importance of the definition.
Table 5.12
Study in Methodology and Major Area of Study
Formal Informal
Major Yes No Yes No
Num­- Per­ Num­- Per­ Num­ Per­ Num­ Per­
ber cent ber cent ber cent ber cent
Marketing 29 46.0 34 54.0 50 79.4 13 20.6
Economics 16 42.1 22 57.9 26 68.4 12 31.6
Other 12 52.2 11 47.8 18 78.3 5 21.7
Source: Appendix A. .
Those respondents with extensive training in economics 
may have a different understanding of methodology than those 
without this training. Many basic and intermediate economic 
theory texts include a discussion of methodology, and this
g
coverage is not nearly so extensive in marketing. Coverage
9For an example of the coverage of methodology in an 
economics text see: C. E. Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory,
Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1966, pp. 1-8.
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of methodology in marketing texts appears to be limited 
mostly to discussions of the scientific method and its ap­
plications.10 This type of background difference may have 
left the respondents with different views of methodology.
Study in Methodology and Interest in Theory
This presentation is used to analyze the relationship 
between those respondents that believe they have studied 
methodology and those who are interested in theory find re­
search. Some degree of connection is easy to anticipate. 
The analysis provides a check on the anticipated results.
Table 5.13
Study in Methodology and Interest in 
Theory and Research
Area of Formal Informal
Interest Yes NO Yes No
Num­ Per­ Nura- Per- Num­ Per­ Num- Per-
ber cent ber cent ber cent ber cent
Theory 6 60.0 4 40.0 9 90.0 1 10.0
Research 19 50.0 19 50.0 31 81.6 7 18.4
Both 1 33.3 2 66.7 2 66.7 1 33.3
Other 28 40.0 42 60.0 49 70.0 21 30.0
Source: Appendix-A.
^■°See the discussion in Chapter II of: Harper W. Boyd
and Ralph Westfall, Marketing Research, revised edition, 
Homewood, Illinois: Richard D . Irwin, 1964, pp. 40-49.
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The figures may be. used to support the anticipated 
results, but a large percentage of respondents interested 
in theory and research seem to feel that they had no formal 
training in methodology. However, a very high percentage 
of respondents interested in theory and research believe 
that they have remedied the lack through informal training. 
Also, the formal training percentages for theory and research 
were somewhat higher than the percentage for other areas.
SUMMARY OP ANALYSIS
The goal of this chapter was to provide background in­
formation on the nature of the respondents and attempt to 
establish the relation between this group and the ideal popu­
lation. To accomplish this goal, the historical data col­
lected through a questionnaire survey (Appendix A and B) 
was presented and analyzed. Besides the analysis of basic 
data, cross-classifications between whether the respondents 
felt they had studied methodology and various historical 
information were presented.
The first major grouping of historical data that was 
analyzed dealt with the institutions which employed the res­
pondents. About 70% of the respondents were employed by 
public institutions. Also, those people that returned the
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questionnaire were largely at the higher levels of academic 
employment. Fifty percent were full professors. This 
characteristic fits well into the image of an ideal popu­
lation.
Another classification which adds insight into the 
background of the respondents is their relation to the in­
stitution that granted the highest degree or present aca­
demic achievement. The large majority of persons that 
answered the questionnaire received their standing from re­
latively large major universities. The Big Ten and Ivy League 
schools had the largest representation among the returns.
The majors of the respondents, while they were working toward 
their highest degree, were largely divided between marketing 
and economics (81.5%) with a little over thirty percent being 
trained in economics.
Considerable personal data was also collected by the 
respondents. The average age was 45.6 with a standard devi­
ation of 10.0 years. Further, the respondents said that they 
had been full-time teachers for an average of 14.0 years.with 
a standard deviation of 9.2 years. In all, both ages and 
years teaching experience were well dispersed around the 
respective means. Also, forty-one percent of the respondents 
stated interest in marketing theory and/or marketing research.
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The respondents were quizzed relative to whether they 
had studied methodology either formally or informally. The 
definition of methodology was left for the individual to 
devise. The purpose of this omission was to determine the 
extent to which these people felt trained in methodology.
The result was that forty-six percent of the respondents 
said they had formal training, but seventy-five percent said 
that they had informally studied methodology.
Four cross-classifications between whether respondents 
felt that they had studied methodology and other elements of 
the historical data were presented in the.chapter. Classifi­
cation with academic rank and with years as a full-time 
teacher revealed that the people furtherest away from their 
present degree or standing had less formal training in 
methodology. These results seem to indicate that a steady 
increase in formal methodological training has occurred over 
the past thirty or forty, years. Also, those people interested 
in theory and/or research only indicated slightly more train­
ing in methodology than others.
Certain generalizations may be drawn from the data 
presented in this chapter. Broadly speaking, the respondents 
were highly educated middle-aged people with a reasonably 
lengthy amount of teaching experience. These respondents 
appear to correspond fairly well with the characteristics
that may be expected to be part of the ideal population. 
The chapter which follows is used to examine the answers 
given by these respondents to questions about methodology.
CHAPTER VI
ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the degree 
of understanding among marketing scholars concerning the role 
of epistemology in developing marketing theory. The pre­
ceding chapters have established that knowledge of episte­
mology may aid the marketing scientist in developing theory. 
The primary hypothesis states that “a better approach to de­
veloping marketing theory can be produced.1' The supposed 
reason that a better approach can be produced is because 
marketing scholars do not have an in-depth understanding of 
epistemology. The empirical analysis which follows is an 
attempt to determine the truth or falsity of this assumption.
The chapter begins with a discussion of the method of 
analysis. The next section is a discussion of the measurement 
of epistemological understanding by marketing scholars. The 
third section involves an effort at determining the degree to 
which the existing body of marketing thought is theoretical. 
The fourth section is an inquiry into differences in answers
which occurred between selected respondent characteristics.
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METHOD OP ANALYSIS
This section contains the methods used for determining 
the facts necessary to the purpose of this chapter. The ana­
lysis used to determine the measurement of understanding and 
the degree to which marketing is theoretical are discussed in 
this section. The section also examines methods for cross- 
classifying the respondents personal data with the data used 
for analysis.
Methodology for Measuring Understanding
Three approaches were used in determining understanding. 
The approaches required respondents to analyze two passages, 
tested respondent recognition of a posteriori problems, and 
located the respondents' favored source of knowledge.
Methodology for Analysis of Two Passages; In order to
determine understanding of the two sources of knowledge, the
respondents were requested to read a passage and classify it
relative to "the fundamental method(s) of developing theory
that it implies.”1 For each of these passages, the same ten
possible responses were given. These responses were: intui­
tive insight, logic, empirical research, self-evident truth
^Questions V and VI, Appendix A.
144
or fact, experience, none of these to a significant degree, 
all of these, methodology and theory are not appropriate
t
topics for the field of marketing, don*t know, and other.
Any combination of the ten possible responses may have been 
selected. Distribution percentages were based on the total 
number of responses. No distinction,was made between single 
and multiple answers. Only two respondents did not answer the 
questions on these passages.
For the a priori passage, intuitive insight and self- 
evident truth or fact are acceptable responses because they 
represent an a priori source of knowledge. This passage ad­
vocates the use of a priori knowledge in developing the 
sciences of human action and thereby supports these two ans­
wers as acceptable.2 Logic is not implied as a fundamental 
method for developing theory by the passage and is not a 
suitable answer. Empirical research and experience both 
connote an a posteriori rather than an a priori approach and 
are not acceptable answers.
The author of the a posteriori passage uses the observ­
ed occurrence of phenomena (a posteriori knowledge) to
2This passage appears as question V in Appendix A, and 
it is taken from: Ludwig von Mises, Epistemological Problems
of Economics, New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1960, p. 130.
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establish the criteria for cause and effect.3 Also, the 
passage advocates the existence of universal causation with­
in its framework for establishing a cause-effect relationship. 
The clues in this passage are not as obvious as those used in 
the a priori passage. That passage amounted to a definition 
of a priori knowledge. This passage is an example of using 
a posteriori knowledge, and it provides another clue in ad­
vocating the existence of universal causation.
Both empirical research and experience are acceptable 
responses for the a posteriori passage, since they are both 
directly related to a posteriori knowledge. Logic is not a 
suitable response because it is not advocated as a fundamen­
tal method for developing theory in the passage. The other 
potential responses, intuitive insight and self-evident truth 
or fact, are a priori and are not acceptable answers.
Methodology for Respondent Recognition of A Posteriori 
Problems: In order to further determine the extent to which
marketing scholars understand the nature and problems of a 
posteriori knowledge, these scholars were requested to 
identify possible legitimate, philosophical objections to a
This passage appears as Question VI in Appendix T\t, 
and it is taken from: John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic,
New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1961, p. 256. The 
passage is one of Mill's canons which are attempts at es­
tablishing rules for determining cause and effect.
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hypothetical passage.^ The passage suggests that a problem 
may exist in predicting that the sun will rise tomorrow 
purely on the basis of historical evidence (a posteriori 
knowledge). The potential responses are stated as objections 
or possible problems, and the first three objections are true. 
The first objection is that historical data cannot be mean­
ingfully extrapolated into the future. The controversy over 
universal causation and uniformity in nature applies directly 
to this objection. The second possible objection states that 
no hypothesis can be totally verified through empiricism.
This objection also has ties with the problems of universal 
causation and uniformity in nature, but the connection is 
somewhat more abstract than the first objection. The third 
objection stated that the sunrise prediction should be prob­
abilistic. Since the possibility exists that an action with­
in the bounds of the laws of nature may cause the sun not to 
rise tomorrow, the objection is sound. The remaining five 
responses are all false. The fourth objection states that 
the example is a case of pure deductive reasoning, but the 
example is more a case of pure inductive reasoning. With 
respect to the fifth response, which states that ultimate
4See Question VIII, Appendix A.
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truths are the only valid criteria for turth, even those 
people that firmly believe in a priori knowledge accept the 
existence of a posteriori knowledge. The sixth objection 
states that the use of logic requires other than empirical 
sources of information, but logic is disjunct from the vari­
ous epistemologies and its use is not necessarily related 
to any epistemology. The seventh objection is also false, 
because of the accepted existence of a posteriori knowledge. 
Finally, the eighth objection is false because application 
of an empirical approach is pragmatic as was discussed in 
Chapter IV. Certain key words such as "only" in the fifth 
objection and "all" in the seventh may have given away the 
correct answers.
Respondents’ Favored Sources of Knowledge: Some in­
sight into the epistemological understanding of respondents 
was gathered by requesting that they rate the importance of 
five elements for developing marketing theory.5 These ele­
ments were the same ones used in the first two passages. 
Therefore, two of the elements were a priori in nature and 
two others were a posteriori in nature. The fifth item was 
"logic" which is neutral with respect to the sources of
5See Question VII, Appendix A.
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knowledge. Each of these elements was to be assigned a num­
ber from one to five indicating its importance relative to 
the other four. The most important element received a one, 
the second in importance received a two, etc. The results 
were compiled by determining what percentage of first place 
votes went to each element, what percentage of second place 
votes went to each element, etc.,-for all five places. The 
percentage of non-responses for each place was included in 
the results.
In order .to further determine the favored source of 
knowledge, the respondent was presented with a complex situ­
ation, and he was requested to briefly list the steps used in 
attempting to find a solution.6 Again, the responses were 
hopefully expected to reveal insight into the respondents1 
understanding of epistemology. The responses were grouped 
into the categories of no response, empirical approach, in­
tuitive approach, both empirical and intuitive approaches, 
and other approaches. The majority of those persons that did 
return the questionnaire did not respond to this question. 
Many of those persons which did respond did so in a hap­
hazard manner. Nevertheless, if an approach could reasonably 
be classified it was used.
6See Question IX, Appendix A.
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Method for Determining the Percent Theoretical 
of Marketing Thought
An attempt was made to establish the degree to which 
marketing scholars believe the existing body of marketing
7
thought is theoretical. Respondents were requested to esti­
mate the percent theoretical attained by marketing thought. 
This request was made in order to establish how far marketing 
scholars believe the field has progressed in developing a 
sound body of marketing theory. If the results indicate only 
small progress, then a large potential exists for things such 
as epistemology that can aid further development. If the 
results indicate that marketing scholars believe that the 
area has already become highly theoretical, little potential 
exists for the acceptance of epistemology.
Method for Determining Effect of Selected 
Personal Characteris tics
The results presented in this analysis are the product 
of cross-classifications of data presented elsewhere in 
Chapters V and VI. The personal characteristics selected for 
presentation in this section are collegiate major, interest 
in theory or research, and age. These three were selected be­
cause they exhibited the most significant results. With each 
of these personal characteristics, results of this study were 
segmented for analysis. These latter three elements are the
?See Question IV, Appendix A.
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analysis of an a priori passage, the analysis of an a posteri­
or passage, and percent to which marketing is theoretical. 
These three elements were selected because the cross­
classified results were more significant than with other 
possible combinations.
MEASUREMENT OF UNDERSTANDING
The following sections are used to measure the episte- 
mological understanding of marketing scholars. To accomplish 
the measurement, five approaches are used. These five ap­
proaches are the analysis of an a priori passage, the analy­
sis of a posteriori passage, respondent recognition of a 
posteriori problems, respondent rating of approaches for the 
development of marketing theory, and the approach for solving 
a complex problem by respondents.
Analysis of an A Priori Passage
Table 6.1 contains the percentage responses to the 
analysis of the a priori passage. The heavy selection of 
intuitive insight as a response was expected. This answer 
was the most obvious, and it may have been selected by res­
pondents with little or no understanding of epistemology.
The primary purpose of offering this response was to give 
those people answering the question one obviously correct
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choicer since some answer was expected. Then, the inclusion 
of a second correct response, not quite so obvious, was used 
in an attempt to determine if a deeper understanding existed. 
As indicated in Table 6.1, the results were not encouraging. 
The ideal distribution of responses has 50.0% intuitive in­
sight and 50.0% self-evident truth or fact. The low response 
for self-evident truth or fact indicates some lack of episte- 
mological understanding about a priori knowledge on the part 
of marketing scholars. It is also interesting to note that 
27.9% of the respondents picked empirical research and experi­
ence. These two answers are related to a posteriori knowledge 
and indicate confusion by the respondents. Also, almost 3% 
did not think any answer applied.
Table 6.1 
Analysis of an A Priori Passage
Possible
Responses
Overall
Distribution
Percent
Intuitive Insight 47.6
Logic 7.5
Empirical Research 12.9
Self-Evident Truth or Pact 3.4
Experience 15.0
None of These 2.7
All of These 4.1
Methodology and Theory
Not Apropos for Marketing 0.0
Don't Know 2.0
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Table 6.1 (Continued
Possible
Responses Percent
Other 4.8
TOTAL 100.0
Source: Appendix A.
Analysis of an A Posteriori Passage
The percentage distribution of answers to the respondent's 
analysis of an a posteriori passage appears in Table 6.2. The 
sum of the percentage responses for the two correct answers, 
empirical research and experience, only accounts for 40.6% 
of the total responses. Conceivably, some of these answers 
are little more than guesses, but in any case, some lack of 
in-depth understanding of the nature and problems of a poste­
riori knowledge is indicated by the results.
The selection of logic as the most favorable responses 
was probably because the passage appears "logical" in the 
steps it uses to establish the nature of cause and effect. 
However, those persons highly familiar with the problems of 
empirical generalization may recognize that a flaw exists in 
the logic of the passage. The flaw lies in the inherent 
assumption that universal causation is a fact. If the selec­
tion of logic as a response may be assumed to be because of 
the logical nature of the passage, then, it is not a
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satisfactory answer. While only 2.3% of the respondents 
confused the passage with the a priori answers intuitive in­
sight and self-evident truth or fact, 8.3% answered all of 
these, none of these, and don't know. As before, the overall 
performance was not encouraging.
Table 6.2
Analysis of an A Posteriori Passage
Possible
Responses
Overall
Distribution
Percent
Intuitive Insight 0.8
Logic 39.8
Empirical Research 37.6
Self-Evident Truth or Fact 1.5
Experience 3.0
None of These 4.5
All of These 1.5
Methodology and Theory
Not Apropos for Marketing 0.8
Don't Know 2.3
Other 6.8
TOTAL 100.0
Source: Appendix A.
Respondent Recognition of Epistemological Problems
The results from each of the potential objections to the 
example on the sunrise are presented in Table 6.3. The re­
sults from the first four objections were only fair. The 
first two responses were well below fifty percent correct.
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while the third response was only 54.4% correct. In a pure 
guesswork situation, fifty percent correct responses were 
expected when only two answers are possible. These results 
tend to indicate a lack of in-depth understanding. The fourth 
response required that the person answering have knowledge of 
the difference between deduction and induction. The proper 
response was no, and this answer is easy to detect for anyone 
at all familiar with the definition of deduction. While only 
23.8% of the respondents selected the yes answer, an even 
lower percent is reasonable to expect from a group of respon­
dents that are truly knowledgeable about the processes of 
methodology. Still, some basic understanding is indicated by 
the 76.2% who did answer correctly.
The results of the last four potential objections were 
much better than the first. All responses for these questions 
should have been no. These questions were designed to be as 
obvious as possible as was response number four. Key words 
such as "only" in the fifth response and "all" in the seventh 
response may have given away the proper answer. Nevertheless, 
the overall results from these responses were good. These 
results indicate that some basic understanding does exist. 
Apparently, a reasonable groundwork is available, upon which 
in-depth understanding may be built.
Table 6.3
Respondent Recognition of Epistemological Problems
Possible Responses
Yes
Percent
No
Percent
Totals
Percent
1. Mere Historical Data Does Not Allow Meaningful Extrapola­
tion into the Future 42.3 57.7 100.0
2. No Hypothesis Can Be Totally Verified Through Empiricism 35.9 64.1 100.0
3. The Prediction Should Be Probabilistic 54.4 45.6 100.0
4. The Prediction Is a Case Of Pure Deductive Reasoning 23.8 76.2 100.0
5. Ultimate Truths Are The Only Valid Criteria For 
Truth 4.4 95.6 100.0
6. The Use Of Logic Requires The Application Of Other 
Than Empirical Sources of Information 14.9 85.1 100.0
7. The Source Of All Knowledge Is The Obviously True 
Constructs Of The Mind 0.8 99.2 100.0
8. The Above Approach Is Not Pragmatic 0.8 99.2 100.0
Source: Appendix A.
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Respondent Rating of Approaches for Develop­
ment of Marketing Theory
The results of rating five elements v;ith respect to 
their importance in developing marketing theory are presented 
in Table 6.4 The column in Table 6.4 labeled weighted posi­
tion value indicates the relative position of importance for 
each of the. five elements.6 From Table 6.4 empirical re­
search is rated most important with a 1.96 value followed by 
logic and then experience. Intuitive insight and self-evident 
truth are rated close to each other but a poor fourth and 
fifth. From the weighted position values, an a posteriori 
inductive approach appears to be the most desirable as rated 
by the respondents.
6These values were obtained by first reclassifying per­
centage responses without including the no response values. 
Second, for each element (e.g., intuitive insight, logic, 
etc.), each position (e.g., 1st, 2nd, etc.) was multiplied by 
the percentage response as a weighting factor. The sum of the 
products for each of the elements is its weighted position 
value. The value for intuitive insight is calculated below as 
an example.
Weighted
Position
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Value
intuitive insight 2U74% 9.1% 17.0% 35.9% 28.4% 3.75
These percentages are recalculated without the no response fig­
ures. Then, 20.4 percent or 0.204 is multiplied by 1.0 (i.e., 
first place), 9.1 percent or 0.91 is multiplied by 2.0 (i.e., 
second place), and so on for all five places. The sum of these 
five products equals 3.75 which is the weighted position value 
for intuitive insight.
Table 6.4
Respondent Ratings of Approaches for Development of Marketing Theory
Elements for Rating
1st
Percent
2nd
Percent
Ratings
3rd
Percent
4th
Percent
5th
Percent
Weighted 
Position Value
Intuitive Insight 18.9 8.1 14.5 26.6 16.9 3.75
Logic 18.9 36.2 20.2 9.7 3.2 2.52
Empirical Research 46.7 22.6 16.1 3.2 2.4 .1.96
Self-Evident Truth 2.4 8.1 9.7 11.3 29.9 3.66
Experience 5.7 13.7 25.0 23.4 7.3 3.12
No Response 7.4 11.3 14.5 25.8 40.3
TOTALS 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Appendix A.
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The no response figures in Table 6.4 also indicate 
something about respondents ratings. Often the fourth and 
fifth positions were not rated. The no response rate in­
creases rapidly and continuously from the low of only 7.4% 
for first place to the high of 40.3% for fifth place. In 
fact, experience, intuitive insight, and self-evident truth 
or fact were often omitted from the rating, which may indi­
cate the respondents felt that these elements play no part 
in developing marketing theory, .or that they do not under­
stand the nature of a priori knowledge.
Approach Used for Solving a Complex Problem
The overall percentage distribution of respondent ap­
proaches for solving a complex problem appear in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5
Approaches Used for Solving a Complex Problem
Categories of Approaches
Overall
Distribution
Percent
No Response 
Empirical Approach 
Intuitive Approach 
Both Empirical and
55.7
36.3
1.6
Intuitive Approaches 
Other Approaches 
TOTAL
4.8
1.6
100.0
Source: Appendix A.
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This distribution of approaches indicates the importance 
of empiricism among those persons that did answer this ques­
tion. As with the previous ranking of approaches, empiricism 
was supported to a significantly greater degree than any other 
approach or combination of approaches. But, the high percen­
tage of no responses to this question appears to indicate 
noninterest, inability, or some of both. Because of the 
generally haphazard manner in which this problem was approach­
ed by respondents, few other conclusions are justified.
Some basic understanding of epistemological problems 
undoubtably exists on a reasonably large scale among market­
ing scholars. The large selection of intuitive insight 
(47.6%) in the a priori passage, the moderate selection of 
empirical research (37.6%) in the more difficult a posteriori 
passage, and the good responses on the less difficult episte­
mological problems in the sunrise example all tend to indicate 
that a basic understanding does exist. Also, a very limited 
number of these scholars seem to possess an in-depth under­
standing of the problems. However, while the foundation on 
which to build does exist, the overall distribution of in- 
depth understanding among marketing scholars seems to be 
centered around a fairly low level. The lack of in-depth 
understanding was indicated throughout the previous discussion.
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The failure to select self-evident truth or fact (3.4%) in 
the a priori passage, the failure to select experience (3.0%) 
and the large selection of logic (39.8%) in the a posteriori 
passage, the failure to recognize the more difficult episte­
mological problems in the sunrise example, and the apparent 
disregard for a priori knowledge in problems requiring the 
rating of elements are all examples of this lack of in-depth 
understanding.
DEGREE TO WHICH MARKETING IS THEORETICAL
The results of respondent analysis of degree to which 
marketing is theoretical appear in Table 6.6. The percent 
theoretical groups 21-30 and 31-40 are so close that the most 
representative model group is 21-40. This group contains 
just under one-half of the total responses (49.6%) and also 
contains the mean of the distribution (36.1%). However, the 
distribution is skewed toward the lower percent theoretical 
values. Almost all of the responses (92.4%) were within the 
fifty percentage points 11-60. Also, 82.4% of the responses 
were in groups of less than or equal to fifty percent, and 
94.1% of the responses were in groups of less than or equal 
to sixty percent. These results indicate that marketing 
scholars believe the existing body of marketing thought is
I
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not highly theoretical. This realization on their part may 
make them more receptive to a discussion of epistemology as 
a tool that can aid in the development of marketing theory.
Table 6.6
Respondent Analysis of Degree to Which Marketing
is Theoretical
Percent Theoretical
Overall
Distribution
Percent
0-10 1.7
11-20 16.8
21-30 26.1
31-40 23.5
41-50 14.3
51-60 11.7
61-70 2.5
71-80 3.4
TOTAL 100.0
Mean 36.1
Source: Appendix A.
SELECTED PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OP RESPONDENTS
The following analysis investigates the effects of dif­
ferences in collegiate major, interest in theory or research, 
and age on the responses given to some of the previously 
analyzed questions. The purpose of the analysis is to glean 
all possible information about the respondents out of the sur­
vey and, in the process, search for facts that may aid
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dissemination of information about epistemology. Analysis 
of the data revealed that three previously analyzed questions 
produced significant information when cross-classified with 
the historical characteristics. These questions include the 
analysis of an a priori passage, the analysis of an a poste­
riori passage, and the degree to which marketing is theoreti­
cal.
Collegiate Major
The cross-classification of collegiate major with res­
ponses to the three questions under consideration produced 
some varying results. These results are reviewed in three 
sections. One section is used forreach of the passages and 
the third is, used for the degree to which marketing is 
theoretical.
Analysis of an A Priori Passage: The results of this
cross-classification are presented in Table 6.7 Those res­
pondents whose university major was either marketing or 
economics seemed to do better than all other majors. The 
percentages of combined correct answers for marketing majors 
was 63.5%,for economics majors wds 54.8% and for the other 
group was only 34.5%. However, the improvement to marketing 
and economics majors by removal of the other group was small.
The percentage of combined correct answers in the overall 
distribution was 51.0%. Still, these results tend to indi­
cate that both the marketing and economics curriculums pro­
vide somewhat better backgrounds in methodology than other 
related areas.
Table 6.7
Effect of Collegiate Major on Respondent 
Analysis of an A Priori Passage
Overall
Distribution Collegiate Major
Possible Marketing Economics Other
Responses Percent Percent Percent Percent
Intuitive Insight 47.6 59.0 50.0 34.5
Logic 7.5 7.6 9.5 6.9
Empirical Research 12.9 12.1 11.9 20.7
Self-Evident
Truth or Fact 3.4 4.5 4.8 0.0
Experience 15.0 18.2 14.3 13.8
None of These 2.7 3.0 2.4 3.4
All of These 4.1 3.0 7.1 3.4
Methodology and Theory 
Not Apropos for
Marketing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Don't Know 2.0 1.5 0.0 6.9
Other 4.8 6.1 0.0 10.3
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Appendix A.
Also, the people with collegiate majors in marketing 
seem to have somewhat better backgrounds in methodology than 
those persons with collegiate majors in economics who have
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switched into the area of marketing. This latter phenomenon 
may be due to the difference between age groups and the youth 
of marketing as a separate field of study in colleges. The 
section on age grouping later in this chapter indicates that 
the younger people did better on this passage than the older 
groups. But the older groups did not have the same opportun­
ity to major in marketing as did the younger groups because 
of expanding collegiate marketing offerings. An individual 
may speculate that the difference which does exist is due more 
to the differences in age groupings than to differences in 
collegiate majors.
Analysis of an A Posteriori Passage: The results of
the cross-classification between collegiate major and res­
pondent analysis of an a priori passage are presented in 
Table 6.8. The conclusions drawn from these results do not 
concur with those of the a priori passage. Very little dif­
ference is indicated between the marketing, economics, and 
the other classification. The summation of correct responses 
for marketing (44.8%) is somewhat higher than those for the 
other majors (39.1%), but the difference is small enough that 
it may be due to chance. Also, the difference is more than 
equaled in the response "other." The answer given in this 
category were widely dispersed, but several of them indicated
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that the respondent had some epistemological understanding.
Table 6.8
Effect of Collegiate Major on Respondent Analysis 
of an A Posteriori Passage
Overall
Distribution Collegiate Major
Possible Marketing Economics Othe]
Responses Percent Percent Percent Perceni
Intuitive Insight 0.8 1.6 0.0 0.0
Logic 39.8 37.3 51.2 30.4
Empirical Research 37.6 40.3 34.1 39.1
Self-Evident
Truth or Fact 1.5 3.0 0.0 0.0
Experience 3.0 4.5 2.4 0.0
None of These 4.5 . 7 - 5 0.0 4.3
All of These 1.5 1.5 2.4 0.0
Methodology and Theory
Not Apropos for
Marketing 0.8 1.5 0.0 0.0
Don't Know 2.3 0.0 2.4 8.7
Other 6.8 3.0 7.3 17.4
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Appendix A .
Proper response to this passage was deemed to require 
a greater in-depth understanding of the nature and problems 
of epistemology. The comparison of results of this passage 
with the preceding passage appears to indicate that, if 
marketing and economics curriculums do produce better back­
grounds, the difference does not provide the students with 
in-depth understanding.
Degree to Which Marketing is Theoretical; Table 6.9 
is a presentation of this cross-classification. The results 
indicate that some differences exist between groups with 
marketing, economics, and all other collegiate majors. The 
difference becomes apparent when the groups are compared for 
less than or equal to thirty percent theoretical. This 
grouping contained 37.1% of the marketing majors, 47.2% of 
the economics majors, and 61.8% of the all other category. 
Considerably more economics and other majors believed the 
existing body of marketing thought was thirty percent or less 
theoretical than did those with collegiate majors in market­
ing. The large difference is made up in the thirty-one to 
fifty percent theoretical bracket. That bracket contained 
45.2% of the marketing majors, 38.9% of the economics majors, 
and only 14.3% of the all other category. Thus, the three 
groups were about equalized at less than or equal to fifty 
percent. The difference in the lower ratings by economics 
and the all other category is apparent in the mean values 
presented in Table 6.9
Interest in Theory or Research
Interest in theory or research was cross-classified with 
the same three questions to yield some informative results.
167
These results are presented and analyzed in the following 
sections.
Table 6.9
Effect of Collegiate Major in Rating the 
Theoretical Level of Marketing
Percent
Theoretical
Overall
Distribution
Percent
Collegiate Major
Marketing Economics 
Percent Percent
Other
Percent
0-10 1.7 1.6 0.0 4.8
11-20 16.8 12.9 16.7 28.5
21-30 26.1 22.6 30.5 28.5
31-40 23.5 27.5 25.0 9.5
41-50 14.3 17.7 13.9 4.8
51-60 11.7 11.3 U . l 14.3
61-70 2.5 3.2 0.0 4.8
71-80 3.4 3.2 2.8 4.8
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Mean 36.1 38.5 35.8 34.2
Source: Appendix A.
Analysis of an A Priori Passage: The results of the
cross-classification between interest in theory and respon­
dent analysis of an a priori passage are presented in Table 
6.10. This presentation is used as an attempt to find out 
whether stated respondent interest in theory or research is 
a determinant of epistemological understanding. Interest in 
both of these areas seemed to go along with better responses 
than for the group which stated no interest in theory or
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research. However, within the group interested in theory, 
there were no responses selecting self-evident truth or fact. 
Since that response was used to indicate in-depth under­
standing, the results are still something less than desirable
even among those persons most interested in theory.
Table 6.10
Effect of Interest in Theory or Research
on Analysis of an A Priori Passage
Overall Interest in Theory or Research
Possible Distribution Theory Research Other
Responses Percent Percent Percent Percent
Intuitive Insight: 47.6 64.3 50.0 43.4
Logic 7.5 0.0 8.0 8.4
Empirical Research 12.9 14.3 14.0 13.3
Self-Evident
Truth or Fact 3.4 0.0 4.0 3.6
Experience 15.0 14.3 12.0 16.9
None of These 2.7 0.0 4.0 2.4
All of These 4.1 0.0 4.0 3.6
Methodology and
Theory Not
Apropos for
Marketing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Don't Know 2.0. 0.0 0.0 3.6
Other 4.8 7.1 4.0 4.8
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Appendix A.
Analysis of an A Posteriori Passage; Table 6.11 repre­
sents the results of the cross-classification between interest 
in theory and respondent analysis of an a posteriori passage.
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These results seem to indicate that those people who were 
interested in either theory or research did not significantly 
differ from those people in the other category. In fact, if 
empirical research and experience are considered to be the 
correct responses, the total percent correct answers for the 
theory group is 42.9%, for research 37.2%, and for the other 
group 43.8%. These results seem to indicate lack of episte- 
mological understanding by the groups most effected and 
justify the conclusions from the preceding passage.
Table 6.11
Effect of Interest in Theory and Research 
on Analysis of an A Posteriori Passage
Overall 
Possible Distribution 
Responses Percent
Interest
Theory
Percent
in Theory or 
Research 
Percent
Research
Other
Percem
Intuitive In­
sight 0.8 0.0 0.0 1.4
Logic 39.8 50.0 44.2 38.4
Empirical Re- 
search 37.6 42.9 34.9 39.7
Self-Evident 
Truth or Pact 1.5 0.0 2.3 1.4
Experience 3.0 0.0 2.3 4.1
None of These 4.5 0.0 7.0 4.1
All of These 1.5 0.0 2.3 0.0
Methodology and The­
ory Not Apropos for 
Marketing 0.8 0.0 2.3 0.0
Don't Know 2.3 0.0 0.0 4.1
Other 6.8 7.1 4.7 6.8
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Appendix A
Degree to Which Marketing is Theoretical: The results
of this investigation appear in Table 6.12. An analysis of 
the information provided from this cross-classification indi­
cates that there is little difference between the group with 
stated interest in theory, the one interested in research and 
the all other category. Those differences which do exist 
may easily be the result of chance. Apparently, even those 
persons without stated interest in marketing theory recognize 
some deficiencies in the existing body of marketing thought.
Table 6.12
Effect of Interest in Theory and Research on 
Rating the Theoretical Level of Marketing
Percent
Theoretical
Overall
Distribution
Percent
Interest in Theory or Research 
Theory Research Other
Percent Percent Percent
0-10
11-20
21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61-70
71-80
TOTAL 100.0
36.1
1.7
16,8
26.1
23.5
14.3
11.7
2.5
3.4
100.0 100.0 100.0
37.1 35.8 37.5
0.0 5.0 0.0
15.4 15.0 17.9
23.1 30.0 25.4
23.1 15.0 27.0
23.1 15.0 13.4
15.4 15.0 9.0
0.0 2.5 3.0
0.0 2.5 4.5
Mean
Source: Appendix A
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Age Groupings
The final set of cross-classified information compares 
the various age groupings with the same three questions 
chosen for comparison in the other parts of this section.
The results of these classifications are presented in the 
three sub-sections which follow.
Analysis of an A Priori Passage: Table 6.13 is used
to present the results of the cross-classification between age
and respondent analysis of an a priori passage. In these age
groupings, the younger people appear more aware of episte-
mological problems than the older groups. Since intuitive 
insight and self-evident truth or fact are the correct res­
ponses, the total percent of correct responses out of all 
responses were 63.0% for the 26-35 years old group, 49.9% 
for the 36-45 years old group, 45.0% for the 46-55 years old 
group, and only 33.3% for the 56- years old and older group. 
Thus, a direct connection between age and acceptable response. 
Moreover, the youngest group did by far the best job in se­
lecting self-evident truth or fact which was deemed an indi­
cation of in-depth understanding.
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Table 6.13
Effect of Age on Analysis of an A Priori Passage
Overall Age Groupings
Distribution 26-35 36-45 46-55 56 &
Years Years Years Over
Possible
Responses Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
Intuitive
Insight 47.6 55.6 45.7 42.5 33.3
Logic 7.5 11.1 8.3 5.0 9.5
Empirical Re­
search 12.9 7.4 12.5 10.0 33.3 .
Self-Evident
Truth or Pact 3.4 7.4 4.2 2.5 0.0
Experience 15.0 11.1 14.6 25.0 9.5
None of These 2.7 3.7 2.1 2.5 4.9
All of These 4.1 0.0 6.3 7.5 0.0
Methodology and
Theory Not Apropos
for Marketing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Don't Know 2.0 0.0 2.1 2.5 0.0
Other 4.8 3.7 4.2 2.5 9.5
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Appendix A.
Analysis of an A Posteriori Passage: Table 6.14 is a
presentation of the results of the inquiry combining age and 
respondent analysis of an a posteriori passage. As was the 
case with other historical characteristics, differences which 
appeared in the a priori classification do not seem to exist 
in the a posteriori passage. The percentage of total correct
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responses are 48.0% for the 26-35 group, 31.0% for the 36-45 
group, 48.8% for the 46-55 group, and 38.1% for the greater 
than 55 group. The apparent trend in the a priori passage 
does not exist in this approach. The conclusion that a lack 
of in-depth understanding about epistemology exists among 
marketing scholars seems to be reinforced by the analysis of 
this cross-classification.
Table 6.14
Effect of Age on Analysis of an A Posteriori
Passage
Overall Age Groupings
Distribution. 26-35 36-45 46-55 56 &
Years Years Years Over
Possible
Responses Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
Intuitive
Insight 0.8 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0
Logic 39.8 40.0 45.2 36.6 42.9
Empirical Re­
search 37.6 44.0 31.0 48.8 28.6
Self-Evident
Truth or Fact 1.5 0.0 4.8 2.4 0.0
Experience 3.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 9.5
None of These 4.5 4.0 4.8 2.4 9.5
All of These 1.5 4.0 2.4 0.0 0.0
Methodology and
Theory not Apropos
for Marketing 0.8 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0
Don't Know 2.3 0.0 2.4 0.0 4.8
Other 6.8 4.0 4.8 9.8 4.8
Source: Appendix A.
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Degree to Which Marketing is Theoretical; Table 6.15 
is a presentation of the results of this classification. An 
examination of the percentages seems to indicate that the 
older groups {46 and older) believe that the existing body 
of marketing thought is somewhat more theoretical them do 
the younger groups (45 and younger). The difference is not 
great, but it does seem to exist. If this is the case, the 
younger doctorates may be somewhat more willing to accept 
the aid of epistemology in developing marketing theory.
Table 6.15
Effect of Age on Rating the Theoretical Level
of Marketing
Percent
Theoretical
Overall
Distribution
Percent
Age Groupings
26-35
Years
Percent
36-45
Years
Percent
46-55
Years
Percent
56 & 
Over
Percent
0-10 1.7 5.0 0.0 0.0 4.8
11-20 16.8 20.0 27.8 9.5 9.5
21-30 26.1 25.0 25.0 28.6 23.8
31-40 23.5 25.0 27.8 21.4 19.1
41-50 14.3 5.0 11.1 16.7 23.8
51-60 11.7 15.0 5.6 16.7 9.5
61-70 2.5 0.0 2.7 4.7 0.0
71-80 3.4 5.0 0.0 2.4 9.5
Mean 36.1 35.0 32.5 40.3 40.0
Source: Appendix A
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SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
The purpose of this chapter was to establish the degree 
of understanding.among marketing scholars on the role of 
epistemology in developing marketing theory. The nature of 
the task and the method of attempting solution limit the pos­
sible results to broad generalizations about those scholars 
that returned the questionnaire. Any attempt to be more 
specific requires that this investigator go beyond the bounds 
of his data. However, establishing broad generalizations about 
the epistemological understanding of marketing scholars is the 
goal of the primary research in this study.
To accomplish the purpose of this chapter, the empirical 
investigation confronted the marketing scholars with several 
problems. First, those scholars were requested to identify 
specific characteristics relative to an a priori and a poste­
riori passage. Generally, some basic understanding was ex­
hibited through this request, but a severe lack of in-depth 
understanding seemed to exist. Second, the ability to recog­
nize the specific problems of an a posteriori approach was 
tested. Third, two methods were used to have the respondents 
rate the two sources of knowledge. The results indicated 
that a strong bias existed in favor of an empirical approach
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over, and perhaps to the exclusion of, an intuitive approach.
In addition to the above attempts at determining under­
standing, the respondents were requested to give their beliefs 
on the degree to which existing marketing thought is theo­
retical. The results indicated that they believed a fairly 
low average exists (36.1%). Also, the distribution was skewed 
toward the lower percentages. One possible speculation from 
these figures is that the low belief on the degree to which 
marketing is theoretical may aid acceptance of any proven 
tool that can assist in developing sound theory.
In a final attempt to glean all possible information 
from the data, certain personal characteristics were cross­
classified with three of the previously mentioned approaches. 
Basically, the results agreed with previous findings and 
tended to firmly back the conclusions drawn from them.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY OP CONCLUSIONS
The purpose o£ this chapter is to summarize the con­
clusions of exceptional importance which have been examined 
in this dissertation. The method used in developing this 
summary is to comment on how the various conclusions apply 
to the hypotheses. The three subhypotheses and the primary 
hypothesis were set forth as the goals of this study, and 
the intent of this chapter is to succinctly discuss them 
relative to the findings which are spread throughout the 
six previous chapters. The conclusions pertaining to each 
subhypothesis are discussed as a major section of this 
chapter. One major section is also used to discuss the se­
lection of an epistemology. The last major section deals 
with the application of conclusions in this study.
SUBHYPOTHESIS 1: ONE BETTER APPROACH TO MARKETING
THEORY DEPENDS ON EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING
In judging an approach for analyzing the epistemology 
used for development of marketing theory, several things may 
be considered. The first subhypothesis states that one
t
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criterion for judging a better approach for developing mar­
keting theories is the degree to which marketing theorists 
understand the problems of epistemology.^ This section is 
used to examine the conclusions which effect that hypo­
thesis. The method used to accomplish that examination is 
to first analyze the value of epistemology in developing 
marketing theory. The discussion of value involves an analy­
sis of four problems and a discussion of the desirability of 
science in marketing. The second part of the method used to 
examine the conclusions which affect subhypothesis one in­
volves ah analysis of the level of epistemological under­
standing.
Value of Epistemology in Developing Marketing 
Theory
Subhypothesis one indicates that epistemology has value 
in developing marketing theory. Then, an important question 
related to this hypothesis is whether, in fact, this value 
does exist. If this value does exist, epistemology can be­
come a major aid to the marketing theorist.
Value was defined as a combination of efficiency and 
desirability. Then, the value of epistemology is the
■^Chapter I, p. 3.
2Chapter II, p. 27.
179
effectiveness it can exhibit in aiding the development of 
marketing theory and the desirability of developing market-* 
ing theory. Epistemology was determined to be something 
less than a panacea for the development of science in mar­
keting, but it was determined to be a potentially valuable 
aid. Scholarly efforts in epistemology are directed in 
search for the nature and criterion of truth. But science 
was briefly defined as a body of truths, and scientists have 
devoted their efforts to discovering truths or developing 
theories about truths. A sound epistemology is a court to 
which scientists may bring their theories in order to test 
them for validity.
Several serious problems must be overcome if science 
in marketing is to become a reality. These problems are an 
important aspect of the efficiency with which epistemology 
can aid the development of science in marketing. If the 
problems are significant enough to prevent marketing from 
becoming a science, there is little that epistemology can do 
to advance the field.
Predictability of Human Behavior; One problem of major 
importance to the marketing man in his guest for science in
3Chapter II, pp. 31-32.
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marketing is the degree of predictability which exists in 
human behavior.^ Can the marketing scientist assume that 
universal causation applies to man in the same manner that 
he assumes it applies to the physical universe? If the 
scientist does not make that assumption, an opportunity for 
predicting human behavior is lost. The solution to this 
dilemma is for the marketing scientist to, first, make 
every effort to determine the degree to which man's behavi­
or is caused and thereby predictable. Second, to the ex­
tent that man's behavior is not caused, the predictions of 
the marketing scientist must be considered as only probable 
(e.g., subject to chance). The solution is less than 
totally satisfactory, but it does allow the development of 
an extensive science in marketing.
Inability to Conduct Controlled Experimentsi Another 
problem lies with the inability of marketing scientists to
c
conduct precisely controlled experiments. This inability 
exists because the marketing scientist can not precisely 
control human action, because the e^eriment becomes, a social 
variable, and because experiment repetition is not possible. 
Fortunately, however, controlled experimentation is not an 
absolute necessity to the development of science in marketing.
^Chapter II, pp. 32-34. 
5Chapter II, pp. 34-37.
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Also, many alternatives are available to the marketing 
scientist which provide an adequate substitute to controlled 
experimentation.
Problem of Value-Oriented Bias: A problem with value-
oriented bias is part of the development of science in mar­
keting.^ Basically, the problem is a skepticism as to 
whether normative or value-oriented judgements can be elim­
inated from scientific efforts in marketing. Some inclueion 
of normative judgements into marketing investigations les­
sens the scientific nature of the study, but if marketing 
scientists strive to be as positive as possible, the effect 
is not significant.
Problem with Cultural Differences: One final problem
of special importance to marketing theorists is the multi­
cultural nature of the world's population.7 Culturally
determined differences among people delimits the possibility
of generalization on human behavior. However, highly ab­
stract theory may be derived which is transcultural in nature. 
Transcultural theories concentrate on the similarities be­
tween cultures rather than differences which may exist.
None of these problems appear to be insurmountable. The ef­
ficiency of epistemology may then be summarized as being less
6Chapter II, pp. 40-42.
7Chapter II, pp. 42-44.
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than totally effective but still a potentially desirable aid.
Desirability of Science in Marketing; The question of 
desirability of science in marketing produces a normative 
question of value judgement.8 The answer to the question 
must be determined either overtly or covertly to establish 
the value of epistemology. If the development of science in 
marketing is not considered desirable, then no matter how 
efficient it is, there is no positive value to be gained from 
its development. In fact, if science in marketing is de­
veloped in spite of its undesirability, the act may be of 
negative value. However, the answer to the question of de­
sirability must be the judgement of the majority of marketing 
scholars and consumers as a whole. This situation exists 
because they are both subjected to the benefits and value- 
oriented problems which are derived from the development of 
science in marketing.
One judgement already given, which may be considered 
as an initial answer to this question, lies in the existing 
trend of marketing thought. Marketing men and consumers have 
largely accepted the movement toward science in marketing.
To this point, then, the question on the desirability of 
science in marketing may be answered with the observation
8Chapter II, pp. 44-47.
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that it has so far been deemed desirable. The future may 
yet produce another determination, but given existing con­
ditions it seems reasonable to go ahead with the efforts at 
developing better marketing theory.
Since epistemology was determined to be both efficient 
and desirable in developing marketing theory, it also posses­
ses value according to the prior definition of that term.
The existence of this value indicates that a better under­
standing of epistemology by marketing scholars can produce 
a better approach to developing marketing theory. The ex­
tent of this better approach depends upon the existing level 
of knowledge among marketing scholars.
Level of Epistemological Understanding
An empirical investigation was conducted in an effort 
to determine the extent of epistemological understanding
g
among marketing scholars. An ancillary goal of this primary 
investigation was to determine the extent to which the exist­
ing body of marketing thought was believed to be theoretical. 
This secondary goal provides insight into the potential ac­
ceptability of epistemology as an aid in developing marketing 
theory.
q
See Appendices A and B.
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The extent of epistemological understanding was found 
to be less than what might be desirable.10 The degree of 
understanding exhibited by respondents to the empirical 
study was judged relative to previously determined standards. 
The standards included the ability to identify specific 
characteristics with respect to an a priori and an a poste­
riori passage, the ability to recognize specific problems 
of an a posteriori approach, and the ability to properly rate 
the two sources of knowledge as a basis for developing 
marketing theory. The results from the passages and the 
recognition of a posteriori problems showed some basic under­
standing of epistemology, but a severe lack of in-depth know­
ledge in the area.11 in the analysis of an a priori passage, 
47.6% of the total responses were replies to the most obvious 
of the two correct answers. However, in that same passage, 
only 3.4% of the total responses were replies to the less 
obvious correct answer. The ideal split of responses is a 
50%-50% division between the two correct answers. Also, 
empiricism was selected as a supremely favorite source of 
knowledge, even to the exclusion of intuitive insight.12 in
10Chapter VI, pp. 150-158.
11Chapter VI, pp. 165-168.
12Chapter VI, pp. 169-170.
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the direct respondent ratings of five elements with respect 
to the element's importance in developing marketing theory, 
the results were significant. A weighted position value was 
calculated as a cardinal measure of the importance of each 
elements The two empirically connected items ranked well 
above the two intuitive elements (Empirical Research = 1.96, 
Logic = 2.52, Experience = 3.12, Self-Evident Truth = 3.66, 
Intuitive Insight = 3.75). This apparent lack of understand­
ing tends to give credence to the first subhypothesis. A 
better approach to the development of marketing theory does 
seem possible if marketing scholars arm themselves with a 
better understanding of the problems of epistemology.
The results of the secondary effort also provided in­
formation. The degree to which the existing body of market­
ing thought is believed to be theoretical was determined to 
be fairly low (mean percent theoretical = 36.1%). Perhaps 
this low level can be interpreted as indicating that market­
ing scholars may be willing to accept a proven aid in their 
attempts at developing marketing theory.
SUBHYPOTHESIS 2: A HIGH LEVEL OP SCIENCE IN
MARKETING REQUIRES AN ACCEPTED EPISTEMOLOGY
Within the physical sciences or well developed social 
sciences, a succinct, generally accepted view on how to
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formulate theory usually exists.13 Acceptable methodology 
for theory development is firmly established. This situa­
tion does not exist for marketing. The marketing scientist 
that devises a theory has automatically selected an episte- 
mology. However, that epistemology may not be consciously 
known, or it may be completely misunderstood. The result 
of this situation is a higher probability of methodological 
errors in marketing theory formulation, lack of elaboration 
about the source of knowledge for given theories and because 
of this inadequate information on the source of knowledge, 
confusion about the validity of some theories.
Subhypothesis two state.? that if marketing is to be­
come highly scientific, marketing scholars must develop the 
requirements for an accepted epistemology.14 The value of 
epistemology to the development of science in marketing was 
previously determined to be related to the efficiency of 
this tool and the desirability of establishing a science.15 
The results were that epistemology can be a valuable aid to 
marketing theorists. While good theory may be developed
13Chapter I, pp. 3-4.
14^Chapter I, p. 3.
15Chapter II, pp. 182-183.
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without proper methodology, the establishment of "a con­
nected and systematized body of truth," in any highly de­
veloped sense, appears to require the development of a 
common methodology. The discussion in Chapter XI noted 
that methodology is the one unifying element common to all 
branches of science.16 The thing which makes an area of 
study, such as marketing, a science is the one possible bond 
it has in common with the other areas of scientific investi­
gation— a scientific methodology. Until a given area follows 
what is generally considered to be a scientific methodology, 
it is not classified as a science by knowledgeable outsiders. 
Science is determined by its methodology. Thus the develop­
ment of requirements for an accepted epistemology by market­
ing scholars is an important step if the field is to become 
highly scientific. But epistemology must not be considered 
a cure-all. A suitable summarization of the situation is 
that, for marketing to become highly scientific, it is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition that marketing scho­
lars develop the requirements for an accepted epistemology. 
This summarization statement satisfies the requirements es­
tablished in the second subhypothesis but does not overstate 
the case.
16Chapter II. pp. 26^ 32,.
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SUBHYPOTHESIS 3: PROBLEMS WITH EPISTEMOLOGICAL
UNCERTAINTY ADVERSELY AFFECTS DEVELOPMENT OF 
SCIENCE IN MARKETING
The third subhypothesis stated that unsettled differ­
ences among authorities on epistemology adversely effects
the ability of marketing theorists to develop the field into 
17a science. These problems are peculiar to epistemology 
and occur in addition to other problems presented earlier 
in this discussion. In analyzing this hypothesis, the dis­
cussion investigates the acceptance of a priori knowledge, 
the problem with induction, and a summarization of how the 
three subhypotheses satisfy the primary hypothesis. The dis­
cussion on the acceptance of a priori knowledge includes an 
analysis of the positivists' attacks on arithmetic and on 
geometry as forms of synthetic a priori knowledge. The 
discussion also includes an analysis of uncertainty surround­
ing synthetic a priori knowledge. The conclusions pertaining 
to the problem with induction include a discussion of induc­
tion and other explanations as a proof of universal causation.
Acceptance of A Priori Knowledge
The arguments of the logical positivists have had a 
significant impact on the acceptance of a priori knowledge
17Chapter I* p. 3.
189
as a valid source. The positivists attacked each category 
of supposed synthetic a priori knowledge in an attempt to 
prove that it does not exist. Each category was then deter­
mined, to their satisfaction, to be either a case of analytic 
a priori knowledge or definitional.
Attacks on Arithmetic: One important area attacked by
the positivists is arithmetic. *** According to many of the 
proponents of a priorism, arithmetic is a major area of syn­
thetic a priori known truths. Arithmetic statements are 
known to be true without reservation to time or space. 
Therefore, ten years from now on the other side of the galaxy 
seven plus five will still equal twelve. The positivists 
were not satisfied with this explanation, and they contended 
that arithmetic statements are tautologies or analytic a 
priori statements. The positivists stated that what is 
meant by 7 is the sum of seven individual items, and simil­
arly, what is meant by 5 is the sum of five individual items. 
Now when these seven and five individual items are grouped 
together (added), that grouping is in every way identical to 
a grouping of twelve individual items. The result is the 
tautological statement that twelve individual items equals
18Chapter IV, pp. 92-94.
twelve individual items.
Attacks on the Unreality of Geometry: Another area of
importance to the a priorist which is also under attack as 
a source of synthetic a priori truths is geometry.**^ The 
a priorists claim that many of the basic propositions of 
Euclid's geometry are known to be true, and yet their truth 
is not contained in the definitions or meanings of the word 
used to describe them. Thus, straightness is an understood 
quality, not quantity, which is the shortest distance between 
two points, among other things. The definition of the 
shortest distance between two points does not necessarily 
contain the concept of straightness, all of which appears to 
support the a priorist's argument. However, the positivists 
contend that the basic proposition of Euclid's geometry do 
not deal with anything which exists in the physical world.
For example, nothing in the, physical world exactly fits the 
concept of straightness even though many things come close. 
The positivists conclude that something which is not about 
physical space is not "about" anything.
Existence of Uncertainty: Other supposed synthetic a 
priori propositions also have come under attack by the
19Chapter IV, pp. 94-96.
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logical positivists.2® Basically, the positivists use two 
definitions of "analytic" in their attacks. The most 
accepted definition is where the negation of a statement 
causes a self-contradiction. The other definition is where 
the positivists claim that the rules of language make a
statement analytic. This latter definition is not accept-
21able to a group known as rationalists. This group argues, 
somewhat convincingly, that the positivists have not dis­
proved the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge. But 
the debate is still occurring. The positivists argue that 
many supposed a priori truths are merely language conventions. 
The rationalists counter by accusing the positivists of using 
mere convention in their choice of a logic, and the arguments 
continue. The result is uncertainty.
The primary conclusion for the marketing theorist is 
that the uncertainty about synthetic a priori knowledge may 
hinder development of science in marketing.^2 However, this 
hinderence is extremely limited relative to the other prob­
lems that must be solved. Moreover, a sound epistemology 
combined with an understanding of the limitations of synthetic
20Chapter IV, pp. 90-93.
21Chapter IV, pp. 98-100.
22Chapter IV, p. 100-101.
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a priori knowledge can be a significant aid to the marketing 
theorist.
The Problem with Induction
The existence of a posteriori knowledge is generally
not questioned, but more important, the use that can be made
23of it is doubted. The problem lies in the uniformity of 
nature and universal causation. The whole process of sci­
entific explanation is based on the search for cause, and 
the belief in universal causation is apparently deeply em­
bedded in knowledgeable human understanding. Knowledge is 
often equated with the understanding of many causal rela­
tionships. Uniformity in nature and universal causation are 
the basis upon which induction rests. If causation and un­
iformity in nature do not exist, induction is invalid and 
no inference may be drawn from basic a posteriori knowledge. 
Justification for the belief in causation and uniformity in 
nature has not been satisfactory according to many skeptics.
Induction as a Proof of Universal Causation; Any at­
tempt to prove the existence of universal causation and 
uniformity in nature by induction necessarily involves cir­
cular reasoning, since they are the basis for induction.2^
23Chapter IV, p. 101.
2^Chapter IV, pp. 105-107.
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The approach is a tempting solution, why can't the numerous 
examples of cause and effect observed in the past serve as 
evidence in favor in induction? The answer is that such an 
attempted proof of induction's validity involves the use of 
induction within the proof. Yet the weight of this evidence 
is probably a major factor for human belief in universal 
causation. Still, this approach is not valid because it in­
volves circular reasoning.
Other. Explanations of Universal Causation; If induc­
tion is not suitable as a proof, is it possible to satisfy 
the strong belief in universal causation at all? The belief 
may be synthetic a priori knowledge or merely habit.2^
Neither of these potential solutions produce happy situations 
for the empiricist because his primary tool is then based on 
another uncertain source of knowledge or no valid basis at 
all. Again, the conclusion must be uncertainty.
The existence of this problem injects an element of
26uncertainty into the efforts of the marketing theorist. 
Induction is a major tool of the scientist, and it seems he 
cannot be sure of its validity. Still, the uncertainty added
2^Chapter IV, p. 108.
2<*Chapter IV, pp. 102-?109.
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by this problem is far outweighed by the benefits that the 
knowledgeable use of epistemology can provide in developing 
marketing theory. The marketing scientist may act as the 
pragmatist suggests, but he may also think as the philoso­
pher thinks. Thus, actions may be directed by the practical 
problems which constantly face the marketing scientist, but 
his thoughts may constantly question the source of specific 
knowledge.
A Better Approach for Developing Marketing 
Theory
The primary hypothesis of this dissertation states that 
a better approach for developing marketing theory can be pro­
duced through the study of epistemology. The discussions on 
subhypotheses one and two attempted to establish the potenti­
al importance of epistemology in the development of marketing 
theory and that a better approach was possible through its 
use. The discussion on sybhypothesis three illustrated that 
problems within the nature of epistemology delimit the useful’ 
ness of this tool but still allow it to be an important aid 
for the marketing theorist. The analysis of these three sub­
hypotheses has reasonably established the validity of the 
primary hypothesis.
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SELECTING AN EPISTEMOLOGY
The selection of an epistemology suitable for aiding 
the development of marketing theory may be a blend of the 
two sources of knowledge or an individual selection of either. 
These two sources of knowledge are known as a priori and a 
posteriori. An infinite combination of epistemologies may 
be generated by applying these two sources in different de­
grees. Therefore, a reasonable approach to providing the 
marketing scientist with needed information on epistemology 
is to concentrate on the two sources rather than infinite 
possible epistemologies. The following discourse is an in­
vestigation of the nature of each source.
Nature of A Priori Knowledge
Basic a priori knowledge was determined to be a product 
of the mind without recourse to information obtained through 
the human senses.27 While most of those persons who believe 
in a priori knowledge also admit the existence of a posteriori 
knowledge, they believe that the human mind is capable of 
generating knowledge independent of experience. How the mind 
accomplishes this feat is beyond the existing level of
27Chapter III, pp. 59-62.
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knowledge according to the a prior1sts. However, some
*
characteristics of a priori knowledge were determined.
One characteristic is the two types of a priori know­
ledge which are possible.28 These two types are known as 
synthetic a priori and analytic a priori knowledge. As 
generally defined, synthetic a priori is the only one which 
adds to man's store of knowledge. Analytic a priori know­
ledge is a useful tool for application in logic, but it does 
not add to the existing level of knowledge.
Another characteristic concerns the abstract nature of 
a priori knowledge.29 A priori knowledge only exists as re­
lationships between universals. Universals are typically 
either relationships or generalized properties, and as such, 
are abstractions from the physical world. Since a priori 
knowledge is a relationship between universals, it is ab­
stracted one level further from the physical world than those 
universals.
Nature of A Posteriori Knowledge and Induction
The other potential source of knowledge is a posteriori 
(after the fact.).30 This knowledge comes directly from
28Chapter III, pp. 62-6<7‘.
29Chapter III, pp. 67-73.
30Chapter III, pp. 73-76.
contact with the physical universe. Data from the outside 
world is passed directly through anytone or combination of 
the five human senses (sense-data) and is absorbed by the 
mind as knowledge a posteriori. Virtually no one denies 
the existence of basic a posteriori knowledge. Even the 
proponents of a priori knowledge admit that all knowledge 
begins with experience. But the individual particular know­
ledge is of limited value unless universals can be derived 
from it.
The derivation of universal knowledge from particular 
a posteriori knowledge requires the process known as induc­
tion.^1 Induction allows an individual to make empirical 
generalizations. Ah empirical generalization occurs when 
many individual objects or events are observed to have the 
same property, and that property is then said to apply to 
all similar objects or events.
After satisfying the primary hypothesis, the one re­
maining task of importance in this dissertation is to urge 
the application of these conclusions. Suggestions on how 
this application may be accomplished are covered in the fol­
lowing section.
31
Chapter III, pp. 76-81.
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SUGGESTIONS FOR APPLICATION OF CONCLUSIONS
The value of epistemology to the development of 
marketing theory can not be realized until marketing scholars 
establish its guidelines of acceptability. To accomplish 
this feat, considerable debate is likely to be necessary. 
Publication of the basic facts in texts and analysis of 
favored approaches in prominent periodicals is suggested as 
an initial phase in the development of understanding among 
marketing scholars. As this information becomes more popular, 
its injection into the graduate level theory courses in uni­
versities may boost interest as well as understanding. Class­
room discussion of epistemology and methodology would be a 
major step forward in establishing understanding of these 
areas. Considering the early stage of marketing evolvement 
toward a science, a good case may be made for concentrating 
efforts in theory courses toward the area of methodology.
Once methodology is better understood and more readily 
discussed among marketing scholars, the author suggests that 
every article and text which deals with marketing theory be 
developed to also contain a statement on methodology used. 
Specifically, a statement on the sources of knowledge used 
for each individual explanation allows the reader to judge
the total value of the theory. Sometimes the source of 
knowledge is obvious from the description of an empirical 
test, but in a science dealing with human action, this 
situation is often not the case. If self-evident fact or 
intuitive insight is a source of knowledge for a particular 
explanation, that fact may be far from obvious. If market­
ing theorists wish the field to be considered a science by 
knowledgeable persons outside the area, they must pattern 
their writings around sound methodology and clearly identify 
the methodology they have used.
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APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THE STUDY
INSTRUCTIONS:
This questionnaire is necessary to develop the hypo­
thesis for a doctoral dissertation. Your help and coopera­
tion in filling out and returning the questionnaire is great­
ly appreciated.
Your answers are to be kept anonymous, and only aggre­
gate figures will be used. Thus, there is no need to sign 
any part of the questionnaire. However,..if you desire a 
summary copy of the results just send your name and address 
in a separate letter.
Please answer all the questions that you can without 
references. Give your first reaction and do not change the 
answer once the decision is made. Do not be concerned if 
you cannot answer all the questions, but return the question­
naire as complete as possible.
Thank you again for your cooperation.
I. Historical Sketch
1. What is your age._______________
2. Please identify the type of institution in which you
teach.
_______Public (State or Municipal)
_______Non-Public
3. What is your academic rank?
_______ Instructor
_______Assistant Professor
_______Associate Professor
Professor
_______Other (Please specify)________________________
4. How many years (approximately) have you been employed
as a full-time teacher?________
5. Which of the following represents your highest academ­
ic standing?
 ______Bachelors
Masters
All but dissertation toward doctorate 
_______Doctorate
  Other (Please specify)_________________ _______
6. From what institution did you attain your highest
.academic standing?
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7. What was your major?
8. what two areas in marketing interest you the most?
II. Have you ever had formal (in the classroom) in-depth 
study of the role of methodology in developing theory 
Yes No
III. Have you ever informally (outside the Classroom) stud- 
oed the philosophical viewpoints on methodology?
Yes No
IV. Where would you place the body of marketing thought,
as it exists today, on the following continuum? Please 
answer by placing an X somewhere along the continuum.
/ / / / / / / / / / /
0 %  2 0 %  4 0 %  6 0 %  8 0 %  1 0 0 %
Non-Theoretical Theoretical
V. Please read the following passage and answer the ques­
tion that applies to it.
"In the sciences of human action we comprehend pheno­
mena from within. Because we are human beings, we 
are in a position to grasp the meaning of human action.
It is this comprehension of meaning that enables us to 
formulate the general principles by means of which we 
explain the phenomena of action."
Please place a check by one of the following items that 
you feel best represents the fundamental method (s) of 
developing theory as implied by the above statement.
__________  intuitive research
__________  logic
__________  empirical research
__________  self-evident truth or fact
__________  experience
none of these to a significant degree
__________  all of these
 ________ Methodology and theory are not appropriate
topics for the field of; marketing.
__________  don't know
__________  other (Please specify)______________________
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VI. Please read the following message and answer the 
question that applies to it.
nIf an instance in which the phenomenon under in­
vestigation occurs, and an instance in which it 
does not occur, have every circumstance in common 
save one, that one occurring only in the former; 
the circumstance in which alone the two instances 
differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indis­
pensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon."
Please place a check by one of the following items 
that you feel best represents the fundamental method(s) 
of developing theory as implied by the above state­
ment.
___________  intuitive insight
___________  logic
___________  empirical research
___________  self-evident truth or fact
___________  experience
___________  non of these to a significant degree
___________ all of these
___________  Methodology and theory are not appropri­
ate topics for the field of marketing. 
___________  don't know
___________  other (Please specify)___________________
VII. Please rate the following in importance for the de­
velopment of marketing theory. (1 most important,
2, 3, 4, 5)
___________  intuitive insight
___________  logic
___________  empirical research
___________  self-evident truth or fact
___________  experience
___________  Methodology and theory are not appropriate
topics for the field of marketing.
 ______  don't know
VIII. Please read the following passage and answer the ques­
tion that applies to it.
For many thousands of years man has observed the sun 
rise from-9•to 15 hours after setting in the evening. 
From this knowledge only, it is predicted by someone 
that the sun will rise tomorrow from 9. to 15 hours
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after setting in the evening. However, another 
party objects to this prediction.
Please place a check by the following statement(s) 
that you feel are possible legitimate philosophically 
based objections to this prediction.
________ Mere historical data does not allow meaningful
extrapolation into the future.
________No hypothesis can be totally verified through
empiricism.
The prediction should be probabilistic.
________The prediction is a case of pure deductive
reasoning.
________ Ultimate truths are the only valid criteria
for truth.
________The use of logic requires the application of
other than empirical sources of information.
________The source of all knowledge is the obviously
true, constructs of the mind.
________The above approach is not pragmatic.
IX. Please read the following hypothetical situation and ans­
wer the questions that apply to it. This situation is 
in no way presented as factual or indicative of anyone's 
thought processes.
SITUATION: Suppose you have been reading about
DNA, the primary chemical that makes up man's 
brain. You have also been reading about the new 
palm size chemical computers under development.
The thought occurs to you that maybe man's brain 
is nothing more than a complex chemical computer.
Now suppose you reason that if man's brain is 
nothing more than a computer, and if the process 
and all of the inputs were known, man would really 
be a mechanistic being capable of being predicted 
with 100% accuracy. Realizing the importance to 
marketing, suppose you personally set for yourself 
the goal of finding out the truth or falsity of this 
thought.
1. Please briefly list the steps you see as necessary 
to determine the answer. There may be more or less 
than 10 steps. Use the back of the page if neces­
sary.
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1. 6 .
2. 7.
3 ._____________________ 8._________
4 ._____________;_______  9._________
5 ._____________________ 10._________
What would you call this approach?
2. If you feel there is another suitable approach,
please briefly list the things you would do under it, 
1. 6.
2 .___________________  7.______________________
3.   8.______________________
4.   9>_______________________
5. 10.
What would you call this approach?________________
3. If you feel there are still other approaches, what 
would you call them?
APPENDIX B 
COVER LETTER
L o u i s i a n a  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y
A N D  A G R I C U L T U R A L  A N D  M E C H A N I C A L  C O L L E G E  
B A T O N  R O U G E  • L O U I S I A N A  . 70803 
College o f Business A dm inistration
October 18, 1968
Dear Professor:
Is marketing a science? Is it an art? Can it become highly 
scientific? Should it attempt to become more scientific?
The assessment of your opinion on these questions can be 
useful in analyzing the present and future role of marketing 
development.
There is a great need for research in the areas of marketing 
methodology and marketing theory. The attached questionnaire 
will provide part of the background information for a doctor­
al dissertation into these areas. Won't you help increase 
the amount and quality of information available? You can do 
so by completing the attached questionnaire promptly and 
sending it to me in the addressed, stamped envelope provided.
Only composite figures will be used for results and YOUR 
RESPONSE WILL BE KEPT ANONYMOUS. In an effort to keep 
individual returns confidential, you are requested not to 
sign the questionnaire. If you would like to have a copy 
of my results just send your name and address in a separate 
letter or card.
You have been selected to receive this questionnaire because 
of your academic position and your interest in marketing. 
Thank you for your effort and interest in completing it.
Sincerely,
Donald P. Robin
Graduate Assistant in Marketing
Shh
Enclosure
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